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I. THE INVASION OF CYPRUS AND THE PERTINENT LAWS 
A. Introduction 
Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 was 
characterized by President George Bush as "naked aggression" and a 
violation of the United Nations Charter. 1 The United Nations Secur-
ity Council unanimously condemned Iraq's actions and demanded 
Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.2 Addi-
tionally, the Security Council voted for mandatory economic sanc-
tions, 3 authorized the use of force4 to achieve compliance with the 
sanctions through the naval blockade initiated by the United States, 
and, on November 29, 1990, authorized the use of force against Iraq if 
Iraq did not comply with Security Council resolutions to leave Ku-
wait by January 15, 1991.5 
It is timely to analyze the analogous 1974 invasion and occupa-
tion of over a third of Cyprus by Turkey. Turkey, a large nation of 
38,000,000 people, used military force against another small country, 
Cyprus, with about 650,000 people. 6 It is also timely to examine the 
1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at Al, col. 6; White House Press Release, Aug. 1, 1990, 31 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1182, 1184 (Aug. 6, 1990). 
2. S.C. Res. 660, 45 U.N. SCOR (2932d mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21425 (1990) [hereinafter 
S.C. Res. 660); N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at AlO, col. 1. 
3. S.C. Res. 661, 45 U.N. SCOR (2933d mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21441 (1990) [hereinafter 
S.C. Res. 661); N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1990, at Al, col. 6. 
4. S.C. Res. 665, 45 U.N. SCOR (2938th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21640 (1990) [hereinafter 
S.C. Res. 665); N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at Al, col. 6. 
5. S.C. Res. 678, 45 U.N. SCOR (2963d mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21969 (1990) [hereinafter 
S.C. Res. 678); N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1990, at Al, col. 6. As of Nov. 29, 1990, the Security 
Council had passed 12 resolutions regarding Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 
6. The key factual difference between Iraq's aggression against Kuwait in 1990 and Tur-
key's aggression against Cyprus in 1974 is the reliance of the United States and other nations 
on oil from the Middle East. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at AlO, col. l; Greenfield, 
Another Kind of "Hostage", Wash. Post, Aug. 13, 1990, at All , col. l; Javetski, Borrus & 
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actions taken to date by the United States and the United Nations and 
the relation of these actions to the rule of law in international affairs. 
B. The Legal Questions Posed 
This article addresses two broad questions. First, whether the 
Turkish government, by its 1974 invasion and occupation of over a 
third of Cyprus using American-supplied arms, violated United States 
laws, bilateral agreements between Turkey and the United States 
under those laws, and any international charters, treaties and conven-
tions. 7 Second, whether the government of the United States, through 
the actions of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, violated its own 
laws in connection with Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cyprus. 
The last section of the article briefly discusses a future course of 
action. 
Harbrecht, Oil War: The World v. Iraq, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 20, 1990, at 22-25; Buderi & 
Glasgall, If Saddam Can be Stopped, Oil's Wild Ride May End, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 20, 
1990, at 26-27; Samuelson, Why We Should Stay in the Gulf, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1990, at 
41. Kuwait is one of the major oil producing countries in the world. Cyprus has no oil. 
Furthermore, there was fear that Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, would move militarily 
against Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, and gain control 
of a major percentage of the world's oil production and reserves. Other factual differences are 
that Turkey was and is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [hereinafter 
NATO] and Iraq is not; Turkey does not have a land border with Cyprus, an island, while Iraq 
has a land border with Kuwait. Additionally, Iraq asserted a border dispute, violation of 
OPEC oil production quotas and irregular activity in drilling for oil. Turkey, citing the Treaty 
of Guarantee under the London-Zurich Agreements of 1959-1960, believed she had the right 
to use armed force to invade Cyprus after the Greek-led coup against the Makarios 
government. 
7. Another significant legal aspect of the Cyprus problem, the looting and continuing 
destruction of the cultural and religious heritage of the Greek Cypriots in northern Turkish-
occupied Cyprus, is not covered in this article. See Jansen, Cyprus: The Loss of a Cultural 
Heritage (Book Review), 2 u. MINN. Moo. GREEK STUD. Y.B. 314 (1986); ACADEMY OF 
ATHENS, CYPRUS - THE PLUNDERING OF A 9000-YEAR OLD CIVILIZATION (1985); Von 
Klaus Gallas, Where the Heavens are Plundered, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE MAGAZIN, 
Mar. 30, 1990, at 78; Yasin, Perishing Cyprus, an article in four installments published in the 
Turkish Cypriot magazine OLAY, Apr. 26, May 3, May 10, and May 17, 1982, translated by 
the Cyprus Press and Information Office, (1989); In the Sea of Turks, Der Spiegal, Jan. 1, 
1990, at 121; a 100-page report on looting and vandalism of Greek churches and graveyards in 
Turkish-occupied Cyprus, prepared for UNESCO by Jacques Dalibard, a Canadian authority 
on religious works of art, was suppressed by UNESCO. Wash. Post, May 13, 1976, at A25, 
col. 1. See also Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman 
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, No. 89-2800 (Nov. 21, 1990) 
(Lexis, Genfed, USAPP file) (Court held in favor of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus 
regarding four sixth-century A.D. mosaics looted from the Kanakaria Church in northern 
Cyprus); Speech, The Destruction and Looting of the Culture and Archae/ogica/ Heritage of 
Cyprus, by Patroclos Stavrou, Under Secretary to The President of Cyprus, at a conference 
entitled Turkey's Violations of Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy held by the 
American Hellenic Institute, Washington, D.C. (May 6, 1989). 
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C. The 1974 Invasion and Occupation 
On July 2, 1974, the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, 
in a letter to General Phaidon Gizikis, the President of Greece, ac-
cused the Greek regime of trying to overthrow his government and 
demanded the removal of about 600 Greek military officers who com-
manded the Cypriot National Guard. On July 15, 1974, the Greek 
Cypriot National Guard, acting on instructions from the junta then 
ruling in Greece, did overthrow the Government of Cyprus in a coup 
d'etat, attempted to assassinate President Makarios and installed 
Nicos Sampson, an ultra rightist as president. 8 Rauf Denktash, the 
leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, which comprised eighteen 
percent of the population, stated that they were "following the situa-
tion closely with the Turkish authorities," that it was a Greek Cypriot 
affair, and that the Turkish Cypriots should "not ... interfere in any 
way."9 
On July 20, 197 4, Turkey, using the illegal Greek initiated coup 
as a pretext, invaded Cyprus by sea and air with forces armed with 
United States supplied weapons and equipment. 10 Turkey cited the 
Treaty of Guarantee under the London-Zurich Agreements of 1959-
1960, which established the Republic of Cyprus, as giving her the 
right to invade. 11 On the .same day, the United Nations Security 
Council adopted a resolution calling upon "all states to respect the 
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus."12 The 
Resolution called for a cease-fire, demanded "an immediate end to 
foreign intervention" in Cyprus and requested "the withdrawal with-
out delay from ... Cyprus of foreign military personnel" except those 
present under international agreement. 13 On July 22, a cease-fire was 
declared and subsequently violated by Turkish armed forces. 14 The 
8. N.Y. Times, July 16, 1974, at Al, col. 8. 
9. U.S. FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (hereinafter F.B.I.S.), July 15, 
1974, at 4. Denktash stated over Cyprus Bayrak Radio: "We are following the situation 
closely with the Turkish authorities. Our duty in this situation, which we believe is between 
Greek Cypriots, is to protect our internal security, to take care of our defense measures, and 
not to interfere in any way in inter-Cypriot Greek events." Id. 
10. N.Y. Times, July 21, 1974, at Al, col. 8. See also R. McDonald, The Problem of 
Cyprus, 18-19 ADELPHI PAPERS 234 (1989) [hereinafter McDonald]: "In the first wave some 
6000 men with 30 tanks were landed by sea and parachute drop. . . . Despite having accepted 
the [U.N.] cease-fire Turkey had reinforced its troop concentration and engaged in a series of 
advances to make its bridgehead more viable." Id. 
11. See infra notes 106-118 and accompanying text. 
12. S.C. Res. 353, 29 U.N. SCOR (178lst mtg.) at 7, U.N. Doc. S/11350 (1974) [herein-
after S.C. Res. 353]. 
13. Id. 
14. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1974, at Al, col. 8. See id, July 24, 1974, at Al, col. 8, July 25, 
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next day both the Greek junta and the Sampson regime fell. 15 Pursu-
ant to the 1960 constitution, Glafkos Clerides, President of the Cy-
prus House of Representatives, was installed as acting President of 
Cyprus. Former Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis was 
called home from his self-imposed exile in Paris and sworn in on July 
24, 1974 to head a unity govemment.16 Meanwhile, Britain, Greece 
and Turkey entered into negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland. On 
July 30, 197 4, the three nations ended the first phase of their talks and 
signed the Declaration of Geneva which called for a second cease-fire 
and for a halt to the expansion of occupied territory .17 Once again, 
Turkey's armed forces violated the cease-fire. 18 At this point, Turkey 
held only five percent of Cyprus and the legitimate Cypriot govern-
ment had been reinstated on July 23, 1974, which reestablished the 
constitutional state of affairs prior to the coup. 
On August 8, 1974, Britain, Greece and Turkey began the second 
round of talks in Geneva. On August 13, 1974, Turkey issued a 
thirty-six hour ultimatum to Greece and Britain to accept Turkey's 
proposal, which was tantamount to partition, for six separate Turkish 
Cypriot "cantons" consisting of thirty-four percent of the island na-
tion for the eighteen percent minority community.19 That same day, 
the United States State Department spokesman, Ambassador Robert 
Anderson, issued the following statement, cleared by Secretary of 
State Henry A. Kissinger, saying that the Turkish Cypriots needed 
more security (although there was no evidence of any danger to the 
Turkish Cypriot community): 
The United States position is as follows: we recognize the position of 
the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improve-
ment and protection. We have supported a greater degree of auton-
omy for them. The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish 
autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been ex-
hausted and therefore the United States would consider a resort to 
military action unjustified. We have made this clear to all parties.20 
1974, at Al2, col. 7, July 26, 1974, at Al, col. 2, July 27, 1974, at Al, col. 2, July 28, 1974, at 
Al, col. 1, July 29, 1974, at Al , col. 5, July 30, 1974, at Al, col. 3; McDonald, supra note 10. 
15. Wash. Post, July 24, 1974, at Al, col. 4-5. 
16. Id. 
17. Lewis, Turks to Remain, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1974, at Al, col. 1. 
18. Id., Aug. 1, 1974, at Al, col. 5. 
19. Id., Aug. 14, 1974, at 1, col. 8. The ultimatum was, in effect, an admission that its 
invasion of Cyprus was not to reestablish the status quo ante in accordance with the article IV 
of the Treaty of Guarantee of the London-Zurich Agreements of 1959-1960. 
20. L. STERN, THE WRONG HORSE 132 (1977) [hereinafter STERN). Stem also wrote 
that Anderson stated that "the United States has been playing an active role in the negotia-
tions" and that Kissinger "has been in frequent contact with Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, 
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On August 14, 1974, Turkey unilaterally broke off the negotia-
tions and violated the cease-fire, launched a second more massive ag-
gression without a pretext, occupied over thirty-seven percent of 
Cyprus - up from the less than five percent occupied as a result of the 
first attack of July 20, 1974, and forcibly expelled over 180,000 Greek 
Cypriots from their homes and properties.21 On that day and ensuing 
days, the United Nations Security Council passed resolutions de-
manding a cease-fire,22 and recorded "its formal disapproval of the 
unilateral military actions undertaken" by Turkey against Cyprus and 
urged compliance with its previous resolutions "including those con-
cerning the withdrawal without delay from ... Cyprus of foreign mili-
tary personnel present otherwise than under the authority of 
international agreements. " 23 
Since the 1974 invasion, Turkey has occupied the northern third 
of Cyprus. During this seventeen year period of occupation, Turkey 
has brought an estimated 80,00024 colonists/settlers from Turkey who 
have been given homes and lands taken from Greek Cypriots and for-
eign nationals including American citizens. 
D. A Brief History of Cyprus 
A brief account of the history of Cyprus is helpful in understand-
ing the present situation. Cyprus is a small island in the eastern Med-
iterranean with an area of 3,572 square miles. The population of 
Cyprus in 1974 was about 650,000, with Greek Cypriots accounting 
for eighty percent of the population, Turkish Cypriots eighteen per-
cent, and Armenians, Maronites and others comprising the remaining 
two percent. 25 Cyprus' Greek cultural heritage, which became the 
dominant influence on the island, can be traced to the first Greek col-
onization in the thirteenth century B.C. Cyprus has had a number of 
rulers including Assyrians, Egyptians, Phoenicians, Persians, Ro-
mans, Byzantines and Crusaders. In 1489 the island was taken over 
including four times by telephone within the past twenty four hours." See also N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 14, 1974, at A3, col. 5. The N.Y. Times headline stated: "U.S. Backs Turks in Cyprus 
But Warns Against a War." Id. See generally c. HITCHENS, HOSTAGE TO HISTORY (2d ed. 
1989). 
21. N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1974, at Al, col. 8. The Turkish force comprised "some 40,000 
men with 200 tanks." McDonald, supra note 10, at 19. 
22. S.C. Res. 357, 29 U.N. SCOR (1792nd mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/11446 Rev. 1 (1974). 
S.C. Res. 358, 29 U.N. SCOR (1793rd mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. S/11448 (1974). 
23. S.C. Res. 360, 29 U.N. SCOR (1794th mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. S/11450 Rev. 2 (1974). 
24. See infra, note 142. 
25. U.S. ARMY AREA HANDBOOK FOR CYPRUS 73 (1971). The 1970 census had the 
population at 628,000. Id. 
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and ruled by the Venetians until 1571 when the Ottoman Turks con-
quered Cyprus and ruled the island until 1878. At that time, Great 
Britain acquired Cyprus in an agreement with Turkey - the Conven-
tion of Defensive Alliance of 1878 between Great Britain and Turkey 
- known as the Cyprus Convention. 26 When Turkey entered World 
War I on the side of the Central Powers, Britain annexed Cyprus. In 
1915, the British also offered Cyprus to Greece if Greece would enter 
the war on the Allied side. Although Greece did enter the war at a 
later date, the British refused to part with Cyprus, claiming that the 
offer had lapsed. Turkey recognized Britain's 1914 annexation of Cy-
prus in article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.27 On March 10, 
1925, Britain declared Cyprus a Crown Colony.28 
Britain bears the original and primary responsibility for the post-
W orld War II tragedies that have befallen Cyprus. After Greece en-
tered World War II, Britain called for Greek Cypriot volunteers to 
fight for "Greece and Liberty."29 As a result, as many as 35,000 
Greek Cypriots volunteered and fought in the British Army in World 
War II. 30 While other colonies were gaining their freedom after 
World War II, Cyprus was told by the British Minister of State for 
Colonial Affairs Harry Hopkinson, during a House of Commons de-
bate, that "[t]here can be no question of any change of sovereignty in 
Cyprus" and that "there are certain territories in the Commonwealth 
which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be 
fully independent."3 1 
26. Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey, June 4, 1878, 
68 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 744 (1877-1878); 3 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL 
274 (ser. 2nd) (commonly known as the Cyprus Convention of 1878). 
27. The Treaty of Lausanne, July 23, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 12, 25 [hereinafter Treaty of 
Lausanne], states: "Turkey hereby recognizes the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the 
British Government on the 5th Nov., 1914." Id. at art. 20. 
28. See generally G. HILL, A HISTORY OF CYPRUS (1952), (four-volume history of Cy-
prus); D. ALASTOS, CYPRUS IN HISTORY (1955); FOOTPRINTS IN CYPRUS (D. Hunt ed. 1982); 
C. KYRRIS, HISTORY OF CYPRUS (1985); S. PANTELI, THE MAKING OF MODERN CYPRUS 
(1990). See also for the post World War II period, M. ATTALIDES, CYPRUS (1979); G. CLER-
IDES, CYPRUS: MY DEPOSITION (1989), a three volume history and analysis. 
29. As colonial subjects, Greek Cypriots could not have been drafted. 
30. R. STEPHENS, CYPRUS: A PLACE OF ARMS 118 (1966) [hereinafter STEPHENS]. 
"[O]fficial recruiting posters called on the Greek Cypriots to volunteer and save the Greek 
motherland." Id. A Cyprus regiment fought in North Africa, Italy, Greece and elsewhere. Six 
hundred and fifty Greek Cypriots are buried in 15 countries. See 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
FORMATION OF THE CYPRUS REGIMENT 19 (1989). 
31. 531 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 507-08 (1954). Britain's responsibility is com-
pounded when seen in the context of Greece's role in World War II and in its post-World War 
II defeat of the communist guerrillas in the Greek civil war. On October 28, 1940, with Eu-
rope under the heel of Nazi Germany and with Britain fighting the Axis powers alone, 
Greece's reply of "OXI" ("No") to Mussolini's surrender ultimatum gave support to Britain 
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Following the Hopkinson "never" statement, Greece decided to 
bring an application for self-determination to the 1954 United Na-
tions General Assembly session on behalf of the people of Cyprus. 32 
Britain opposed the Greek government's application for self-determi-
nation for the Cypriots. Although Turkey had renounced all rights to 
Cyprus, Britain claimed that the presence of an eighteen percent 
Turkish Cypriot minority was an obstacle to a solution. 33 A tripartite 
conference among Britain, Greece and Turkey was held in London in 
late August and early September 1955 to discuss the situation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. 34 The conference ended in fail-
ure. Britain, however, accomplished her objective: greater Turkish 
and the forces of freedom. Greece's successful counterattack against Mussolini's invading ar-
mies forced Hitler to attack Greece in the spring of 1941, thereby delaying Hitler's invasion of 
the Soviet Union from April to June, 1941, and requiring the diversion of valuable troops and 
equipment. As a result, Greece's role was a substantial factor in preventing Hitler's defeat of 
the Soviet Union. See A. ZAPANTIS, HITLER'S BALKAN CAMPAIGN AND THE INVASION OF 
THE U.S.S.R. 85-86 (1987) (citing E. RAEDER, MY LIFE 338 (1960)). Over 600,000 Greeks 
died in World War II, a staggering 9% of the then seven million population. In contrast with 
Greece, Turkey abandoned its treaty with Britain and France, remained neutral, and profited 
from both sides. In fact, Turkey supplied Hitler with chromium, a vital resource to Nazi 
Germany's armaments industry and war effort. See F. WEBER, THE Ev ASIVE NEUTRAL 44 
(1979). Hitler's armaments chief, Albert Speer, provided Hitler a memorandum in November, 
1943 on "Alloys in Armaments Productions and the Importance of Chromium Imports from 
the Balkans and Turkey," which stated that the loss of chromium supplies from Turkey would 
end the war in about 10 months. A. SPEER, INSIDE THE THIRD REICH 316-17, 405, 550 n.10 
(1970). 
Following World War II, Greece was involved in civil war against communist forces from 
1945-1949 while the rest of Europe was rebuilding. Greece's defeat of the communists, with 
the assistance of American military aid but without American combat troops, was a major 
turning point in the post-World War II period. It prevented the communist takeover of 
Greece, including Crete, and thereby prevented the communists from taking control of the 
Eastern Mediterranean with its strategic proximity to the Middle East and oil resources. 
32. 52 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. No. A/2703 at 1 (1954). Since they were under colonial 
rule, the Greek Cypriots had no standing to bring the application themselves. The principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples is enshrined in the United Nations Charter in 
the opening Chapter on Purposes and Principles, under article 1 on "The Purposes of the 
United Nations," and also figures in articles 55 and 56. Article 1, paragraph 2 states as among 
the founding purposes: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace." 
33. See Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 27, at art. 16, which states: 
Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territo-
ries situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other 
than those over which her sovereignty is recognized by the said Treaty, the future of 
these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. 
The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising 
from neighbourly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and 
any limitrophe countries. 
34. The Tripartite Conference on The Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus, CMND, No. 
9594 (1955). N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1955, at Al, col. 1. 
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involvement in the matter to blunt the Greek Government's efforts on 
behalf of self-determination for the people of Cyprus. 3s 
The Turkish government, to demonstrate its interest in Cyprus at 
the time of the tripartite conference, planned and organized riots 
against its Greek citizens and residents in Istanbul and Izmir. It ex-
ploded a bomb in the Turkish Consulate in Salonika, Greece, and a 
false report was spread that Kemal Atatiirk's birthplace had been 
bombed and destroyed. The following account from an article in 
Harper's Magazine describes the carnage: 
On the fifth of September 1955, a bomb exploded under singular 
circumstances inside the Turkish Consulate at Salonika in Northern 
Greece. The Turkish press and radio, over which the government is 
influential, blared out the incendiary and false report that the nearby 
birthplace of Kemal Atatiirk, a sort of Turkish Mount Vernon on 
foreign soil, had also been destroyed. The events of the following day 
in Turkey were planned and executed with the same discipline the 
Nazis used in their onslaughts on the Jews. Squads of marauders 
were driven to the shopping area in trucks and taxis, waving picks 
and crowbars, consulting lists of addresses, and the police stood by 
smiling. Greek priests were reported circumcised, scalped, burned in 
bed; Greek women raped. The Greek Consulate was destroyed in 
Izmir. Just nine out of eighty Greek Orthodox churches in Istanbul 
were left undesecrated; twenty-nine were demolished. Ghouls in-
vaded the huge Greek cemetery where Patriarchs of Constantinople 
are buried, opened mausoleums, dug up graves, and flung bones into 
the streets; corpses waiting burial were lanced with knives. There 
had been no comparable destruction of Greek sanctuaries since the 
fall of Constantinople. 
The Turkish government did its best to keep the world from 
knowing. A familiar heavy hand fell upon the press, and editors who 
criticized Premier Menderes were jailed again. 36 
35. See c. FOLEY, LEGACY OF STRIFE 35 (1964); N. CRAWSHAW, THE CYPRUS REVOLT 
123-24 (1978) [hereinafter CRAWSHAW]. As C.L. Sulzberger stated in his column Foreign 
Affairs: 
[T]he British privately encouraged the Turks to express their interest. That was all 
Ankara needed. Ever since Turkey has been whipping itself into a frenzy over Cyprus. 
Instead of being dismayed, the British Foreign Office - which had taken over the hot 
potato from the colonial office - was pleased to cite Turkey's arguments as further 
excuse for doing nothing about changing the island's status. 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1955, at A26, col. 5. 
36. Phillips, What Is The Matter With Mary Jane? The Tragicomedy of Cyprus, 
HARPER'S MAGAZINE 43, at 48 (June 1956). See a/so N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1955, at Al, col. 5; 
Id., Sept. 12, 1955, at A8, col. 3. "The amount of damage has been assessed unofficially at 
$300,000,000." Id., Sept. 13, 1955, at AlO, col. 6. 
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Ethnarch Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus and the British Gov-
ernor of Cyprus, Field Marshall Sir John Harding, entered into nego-
tiations in October 1955 on the future status of Cyprus. The 
negotiations broke down in late February 1956, as Britain was unwill-
ing to commit to majoritarian controlled self-government for Cy-
prus. 37 Shortly thereafter, on March 9, 1956, Britain abducted, exiled 
and imprisoned the Archbishop. 38 As future events that year demon-
strated, Britain apparently wanted unfettered use of Cyprus as a mili-
tary base. On October 29, 1956, Britain, France and Israel invaded 
Egypt. 39 The decision to use Cyprus as a base for Britain's aggression 
against Egypt is well documented. 40 After the Suez debacle, which 
ended Prime Minister Anthony Eden's career, Britain decided that a 
base on Cyprus rather than Cyprus as a base . was a more feasible 
alternative. 
Mr. Lennox-Boyd, Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
continued Britain's well-known divide and rule policy. In discussing 
possible self-determination in the House of Commons on December 
19, 1956, he stated that it should apply equally and separately to 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots and "must include partition among the 
eventual options." The seeds of partition were thereby sown.41 
The Greek Government persisted in its application for self-deter-
mination, and Britain continued its opposition. In December 1957, 
the General Assembly passed a resolution stating the "earnest hope 
that further negotiations and discussions will be undertaken in a spirit 
of co-operation with a view to having the right of self-determination 
applied in the case of the people of Cyprus. "42 Although the resolu-
tion passed by a majority vote of thirty-one to twenty-three with 
37. 102 CONG. REC. 8,771-73 (1956) (Memorandum of the Ethnarchy of Cyprus on the 
Deportation of His Beatitude, Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus). 
38. NATO and the Rift Over Cyprus, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1956, at Al, col. 8. By tradi-
tion, the head of the Greek Orthodox Church is considered the Ethnarch, i.e., the political 
leader of the community, when the people are under foreign rule. 
39. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1956, at Al, col. 8. 
40. See M. FOOT AND M. JONES, GUILTY MEN-SUEZ AND CYPRUS (1957); C.L. 
COOPER, THE LION'S LAST ROAR (1978); R. FULLICK AND G. POWELL, SUEZ: THE DOUBLE 
WAR (1979); K. LOVE, SUEZ: THE TWICE FOUGHT WAR (1970); H. THOMAS, THE SUEZ 
AFFAIR (1967); G. REGAN, GREAT MILITARY DISASTERS (1987). 
41. 562 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1267-68 (1956). Evriviades, The Legal Dimension of 
the Cyprus Conflict, 10 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 227, 234-35 (1975). s. ZYDIS, CYPRUS: CONFLICT 
AND CONCILIATION, 1954-1958, passim (1967) [hereinafter ZYDIS]. If granted the right of 
self-determination, the 80% Greek Cypriot majority would have voted for "enosis," union 
with Greece, a long-held aspiration. The 18% Turkish Cypriot minority called for " taksim" 
or partition. 
42. 12 U.N. GAOR (731st plen. mtg.) at 618, U.N. Doc. No. A/3794, at 2 (1957). 
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twenty-four abstentions, it did not achieve the two-thirds vote re-
quired under United Nations Charter article 18(2) to become a "rec-
ommendation with respect to the maintenance of international peace 
and security."43 
On the night of June 7, 1958, the Turkish Cypriots started the 
first intercommunal trouble by exploding a bomb at the Information 
Bureau of the Turkish Consulate in Nicosia. The Turkish Cypriots 
falsely blamed the Greek Cypriots for the act and began burning and 
looting Greek Cypriot shops and homes. The Greek Cypriots re-
sponded and before long fighting spread throughout the island. 44 
On August 16, 1960, Cyprus gained its fettered independence 
from British colonial rule through the London-Zurich Agreements of 
1959-1960 negotiated by Britain, Greece and Turkey, and presented 
to the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as a package to be agreed to with-
out modification. 45 The Agreements barred both union with Greece 
and partition. The British were prepared to implement unilaterally 
the Macmillan partition plan if Archbishop Makarios refused to sign. 
Consequently, Archbishop Makarios signed for the Greek Cypriots 
and Dr. Fazil Kuchuck signed for the Turkish Cypriots. The consti-
tution provided the eighteen percent Turkish Cypriot minority with a 
veto power over major governmental actions, including taxation, de-
fense, security, foreign affairs and municipal matters, and contained a 
provision barring amendment of the basic articles. These undemo-
cratic features of the constitution have been a major cause of the dis-
pute between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 46 
Predictably, the divisive constitution created problems.47 The 
43. See U.N. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., 1957 U.N.Y.B. 72-76 (1958); Ehrlich, Cyprus, the 
'Warlike Isle': Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis, 18 STAN. L. REV. at 1027-31 (1966) 
[hereinafter Ehrlich]; ZYDIS, supra note 41. 
44. Twenty six years later, Rauf Denktash, then a young lawyer and now the Turkish 
Cypriot leader, admitted on British television that a friend of his had set the bomb. See Cy-
prus: The Bitter Legacy (BBC television broadcast, 1984). 
45. Ehrlich, supra note 43, at 1060-61. STEPHENS, supra, note 30, at 160. McCaskill, 
Cyprus Twenty-five Years Later: A Diplomat Looks Back, [hereinafter McCaskill], in 2 THE 
RULE OF LA w AND CONDITIONS ON FOREIGN AID TO TURKEY 22-25, (Conference Proceed-
ings of the American Hellenic Institute, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter THE RULE OF LAW]. 
46. The constitution may be found in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS - EUROPE 138-221 
(A. Peasley, 3d ed. 1968). See also s. DE SMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CON-
STITUTION (1964); P. POLYVIOU, CYPRUS, THE TRAGEDY AND THE CHALLENGE 16-33 
(1975); Ehrlich, supra note 43 at 1031-40; s. KYRIAKIDES, CYPRUS: CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND CRISIS GOVERNMENT (1968); McCaskill, supra note 45, at 26-29; Bureau of Intelligence 
& Research, U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 8047, Analysis of the Cyprus Agreements (1959), 
reprinted in J. HELLENIC DIASPORA 9-31 (Winter 1984); c. TORNARITIS, CYPRUS AND ITS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND 0rHER LEGAL PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1980). 
4 7. See generally supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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Turkish Cypriots, among other things, would not cooperate on tax 
legislation. In November 1963, President Makarios submitted for dis-
cussion to the Turkish Cypriots thirteen proposed amendments to the 
constitution to correct its undemocratic features. 48 Although 
Makarios thought he had the support of the British High Commis-
sioner, Britain remained silent on Makarios' proposals for constitu-
tional reform. Turkey rejected the proposals, before any response 
from the Turkish Cypriots, and then the Turkish Cypriots followed 
suit. 
In December 1963, an incident sparked the outbreak of in-
tercommunal fighting which led Turkey to threaten an invasion. 
There were several overflights of Nicosia by Turkish air force planes 
during the last week of December. Diplomatic activity resulted in 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 of March 4, 1964, 
48. The 13 proposed revisions were: 
1. The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic should 
be abandoned. See art. 57. 
2. The Vice-President of the Republic should deputize for the President of the Re-
public in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. See 
art. 44(2). 
3. The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-Presi-
dent should be elected by the House as a whole. Presently, the Greek members 
vote for the President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish members 
vote for the Vice President. See art. 72. 
4. The Vice-President of the House of Representatives should deputize for the Presi-
dent of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his 
duties. See art. 72. 
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of cer-
tain laws by the House of Representatives should be abolished. See art. 78. 
6. Unified Municipalities should be established. See art. 173(1). 
7. The administration of Justice should be unified. This revision would affect a 
number of articles. 
8. The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie should be abol-
ished. See art. 130. 
9. The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defense Forces should 
be determined by law. See art. 130. 
10. The number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the Public Service and the Forces 
of the Republic should be proportioned according to the ratio of Greek and Turk-
ish Cypriots in the population. See art. 123. 
11. The number of the Members of the Public Service Commission should be reduced 
from ten to five. See art. 124. 
12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission should require a simple majority. 
See art. 125. 
13. The Greek Communal Chamber should be abolished. See art. 86. 
See Ehrlich, supra note 43, at 1043-44. Makarios, Proposals to Amend the Constitution, Inter-
national Relations (Athens), Apr. 24, 1964, at 8-25. See McCaskill, supra note 45, at 29; 
STEPHENS, supra note 30, at 179; CRAWSHAW, supra note 35, at 366; J. REDDAWAY, BUR-
DENED WITH CYPRUS-THE BRITISH CONNECTION 138 (1986). 
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which quoted article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter against the 
"threat or 'use' of force," recommended the creation of a United Na-
tions Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, and the designation of a media-
tor. As a result, a mediator was appointed and a United Nations 
Force was created, which became operational on March 27, 1964. 
The intercommunal troubles continued. Turkey again 
threatened to invade in June, 1964, but was deterred by United States 
diplomatic efforts including a letter from President Lyndon Johnson. 
Nevertheless, Turkey did bomb Cyprus on August 8 and 9, 1964, and 
the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution calling on 
Turkey "to cease instantly" the bombing. The next crisis occurred in 
November 1967. President Johnson sent Cyrus Vance to Cyprus on a 
diplomatic mission to prevent the outbreak of further hostilities. 
Vance's mission was a success; between 1968 and 1974 talks were held 
to halt the intercommunal conflict and to achieve a new constitutional 
arrangement. Substantial progress was made. Nevertheless, the fate-
ful events of 1974 precluded further progress on a negotiated settle-
ment at that time. 
II. TURKEY'S AGGRESSION VIOLATIVE OF UNITED STATES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
A. United States Laws and the Bilateral Agreements 
Under Those Laws 
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,49 as amended, and the For-
eign Military Sales Act set forth the purposes, so terms and conditions 
of United States military assistance and military sales programs. The 
United States-Turkey bilateral agreement under those Acts is 
designed to make sure that the recipient country understands and 
agrees to the purposes and conditions that accompany United States 
arms transfers. 
The language of both statutes is clear and unambiguous regard-
ing the use of United States-supplied arms. The Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 proclaims the fundamental policy of the United States 
against aggression and against the use of force except for defensive 
purposes. The Act states in part: 
The Congress of the United States reaffirms the policy of the United 
States to achieve international peace and security through the United 
Nations so that armed force shall not be used except for individual or 
49. 22 u.s.c. § 2301 (1990). 
50. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1990) (renamed The Arms Export Control Act). 
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collective self-defense. The Congress hereby finds that the efforts of 
the United States and other friendly countries to promote peace and 
security continue to require measures of support based upon the prin-
ciple of effective self-help and mutual aid. It is the purpose of this 
part to authorize measures in the common defense against internal 
and external aggression, including the furnishing of military assist-
ance, upon request, to friendly countries and international 
organizations. s 1 
The provisions of section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
and section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act are similar. Basi-
cally, these acts provide and proclaim that United States military 
equipment can only be used for defensive purposes. Any country 
which violates these acts is "immediately ineligible" for further assist-
ance and sales. 
Section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provided in 
1974 that: 
Any country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense 
services furnished such country under this Act, the Mutual Security 
Act of 1954, as amended, or any predecessor foreign assistance Act, 
in substantial violation of the provisions of this chapter (22 U.S.C. 
2311 et seq.) or any agreements entered into pursuant to any of such 
Acts shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance. 52 
51. 22 u.s.c. § 2301 (1990). 
52. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(d) (1990)(emphasis added). Section 304(a) of the International Se-
curity Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (90 Stat. 751) (1976) amended 
§ 505(d) to remove the "immediately ineligible for further assistance" language and thereby 
eliminated the mandatory nature of the penalty /sanction for misuse of our arms assistance and 
sales. Subsection (d) presently reads as follows: 
(1) Assistance and deliveries of assistance under this chapter to any country shall be 
terminated as hereinafter provided, if such country uses defense articles or defense serv-
ices furnished under this Act, the Mutual Security Act of 1954, or any predecessor 
Foreign Assistance Act, in substantial violation (either in terms of quantities or in 
terms of the gravity of the consequences regardless of the quantities involved) of any 
agreement entered into pursuant to any such Act (A) by using such articles or services 
for a purpose not authorized under section 502 or, if such agreement provides that such 
articles or services may only be used for purposes more limited than those authorized 
under section 502, for a purpose not authorized under such agreement; (B) by transfer-
ring such articles or services to, or permitting any use of such articles or services by, 
anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the recipient country without the consent 
of the President; or (C) by failing to maintain the security of such articles or services. 
(2)(A) Assistance and deliveries of assistance shall be terminated pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection if the President so determines and so states in writing to the 
Congress, or if the Congress so finds by joint resolution. 
(B) The President shall report to the Congress promptly upon the receipt of infor-
mation that a violation described in paragraph ( 1) of this subsection may have 
occurred. 
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Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act sets forth the purposes 
for which our assistance can be used. It reads in part: 
Defense articles and defense services to any country shall be fur-
nished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to per-
mit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective 
arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in 
collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose 
of maintaining or restoring international peace and security. . . . s3 
Subsection 505(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act states that the 
recipient country shall agree not to use defense articles for non-au-
thorized purposes without the consent of the President. It reads in 
part: 
In addition to such other provisions as the President may require, no 
defense articles shall be furnished to any country on a grant basis 
unless it shall have agreed that - (1) it will not, without the consent 
of the President .... (C) use or permit the use of such articles for 
purposes other than those for which furnished. s4 
Section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act provided: 
[A]ny foreign country which hereafter uses defense articles or defense 
services furnished such country under this Act, in substantial viola-
tion of any provision of this Act or any agreement entered into under 
this Act, shall be immediately ineligible for further cash sales, credits, 
or guarantees. ss 
1. Violation of United States Laws 
The basic facts are not in dispute. Cyprus is an island separated 
from Turkey by forty miles of sea. There is no question of a disputed 
border or border incident. Nevertheless, Turkey transported its 
troops equipped with United States supplied arms and equipment to 
Cyprus, via ship and air, while its United States-supplied planes 
(3) Assistance to a country shall remain terminated in accordance with paragraph (1) 
of this subsection until such time as-
(A) the President determines that the violation has ceased; and 
(B) the country concerned has given assurances satisfactory to the President that 
such violation will not recur. 
(4) The authority contained in section 614(a) of this Act may not be used to waive the 
provisions of this section with respect to further assistance under this chapter. 
Section 304(b) similarly amended§ 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2451-
3900, at 310 (1990). 
53. 22 U.S.C. § 2302 (1990)(emphasis added). 
54. 22 U.S.C. § 2314(a) (1990). 
55. 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c) (1974). 
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bombed military and civilian targets in Cyprus. American-supplied 
arms and equipment were used by Turkey in the initial invasion/ag-
gression of July 20, 197 4, and the renewed attack on August 14, 197 4, 
after the coup had collapsed and the legitimate government restored. 
Turkey did not use these arms for "internal security," "legitimate 
self-defense," or "to participate in regional or collective arrangements 
or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations." 
Turkey used United States-supplied arms for aggressive purposes 
by invading a sovereign nation. Because Turkey's action did not 
come within any of the purposes set forth in section 502 of the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961, Turkey was in violation of that Act, and 
under section 505( d) of that Act, was "immediately ineligible for fur-
ther assistance." Also as a result, under section 3(c) of the Foreign 
Military Sales Act, Turkey was "immediately ineligible for further 
cash sales, credits, or guarantees. "S6 
2. Recognition by Congress; Reaction by the Administration 
In September through December, 1974, the Congress of the 
United States upheld the integrity of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act in over a dozen votes,s1 in-
56. There is no legal distinction between the invasion/aggression of July 20, 1974 and the 
renewed aggression of August 14, 1974. Both involved unauthorized use of United States 
military arms and equipment and Turkey is culpable in each instance. 
57. The following are the key votes in the Congress between September and December of 
1974: 
S. Res. 1897, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 31,923 (1974). Senate votes 64 to 
27 to pass a non-binding resolution introduced by Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo), 
expressing the sense of the Senate that Turkey be immediately ineligible for further 
military assistance from the United States because it violated United States foreign aid 
laws and the bilateral agreement under those laws. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1974, at A4, 
col. 2. 
120 CONG. REC. 32,439-40 (1974). House of Representatives votes 307 to 90 to attach 
the DuPont-Rosenthal amendment to the continuing resolution on appropriations, H.J. 
Res. 1131. The amendment suspends military assistance and sales to Turkey "until the 
President certifies to Congress that substantial progress toward agreement has been 
made regarding military forces in Cyprus." N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1974, at Al, col. 8. 
120 CONG. REC. 32,948 (1974). Senate votes 57 to 20 for an amendment to H.J. Res. 
1131 suspending military assistance and sales to Turkey until Turkey is in compliance 
with United States laws and mandating that the Executive Branch apply the statutory 
penalty to any nation using American arms for purposes other than for which they 
were granted (Sept. 30, 1974). N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1974, at Al, col. 4. 
120 CONG. REC. 33,272 (1974). Senate votes 59 to 29 to defeat a motion to recommit 
H.J. Res. 1131. President Ford announces he will veto the continuing resolution on 
appropriations if it contains language halting military assistance and sales to any coun-
try. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1974, at Al, col. 8. 
120 CONG. REC. 34, 157 (1974). House of Representatives rejects Conference Commit-
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eluding two near overrides of presidential vetoes. Congress finally en-
tee's "watered down" language by a vote of 291 to 69, and then the DuPont-Rosenthal 
amendment is agreed to by voice vote. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1974, at Al, col. 1. 
120 CONG. REC. 34,624 (1974). Senate rejects Conference Committee's "watered 
down" language by a vote of 62 to 16. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1974, at Al, col. 3. 
S.J. Res. 247, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 34,677 (1974). By a vote of 40 to 
35, Senate passes the Mansfield motion, which authorizes the President to postpone the 
arms cut off to Turkey until December 15, 1974, if he determines such action would 
help the Cyprus negotiations. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1974, at Al, col. 3. 
120 CONG. REC. 35,429 (1974). House of Representatives rejects S.J. Res. 247 by a 
vote of 187 to 171. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1974, at Al, col. 2. 
On Oct. 14, 1974, President Ford vetoes H.J. Res. 1131 (Fiscal Year 1975 Continuing 
Resolution on Appropriations), which contains an amendment banning military aid to 
Turkey until the President certifies to Congress that "substantial progress" has been 
made toward agreement regarding military forces in Cyprus, and that Turkey is in 
compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1974, at Al, col. 1. 
120 CONG. REC. 35,608-9 (1974). House of Representatives fails to override President 
Ford's veto of H.J. Res. 1131. The House's final vote of 223 to 135 falls 16 votes short 
of the two-thirds needed to override a veto, thus requiring a new continuing resolution 
on appropriations for the fiscal year 1975. N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1974, at Al, col. 5. 
120 CONG. REC. 35,733 (1974). House of Representatives passes, by a vote of 194 to 
144, a new amendment to H.J. Res. 1163 (Continuing Resolution on Appropriations) 
calling for a cut off of military aid to Turkey. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1974, at Al, col. 3. 
120 CoNG. REC. 35,908 (1974). Senate rejects, by a vote of 40 to 27, the Mansfield 
Amendment, which would have allowed the President to delay the aid cut off to Turkey 
until December 10, 1974, and passes a new H.J.Res. 1163. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1974, 
at Al, col. 3. President Ford vetoes the continuing resolution on appropriations for the 
second time (H.J. Res. 1163 was the second resolution) insisting that such action is 
detrimental to United States national security interests in the Mediterranean and that it 
will cause a deterioration of the political situation in Cyprus. Id. 
120 CONG. REC. 36,018-19 (1974). House of Representatives, in a vote of 161 to 83, 
falls two votes short of overriding the second presidential veto of legislation containing 
provisions to cut off aid to Turkey. N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1974, at Al, col. 2. H.J. Res. 
1167, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 36,023 (1974). In an agreement with the 
White House on a December 10, 1974 cut-off date, H.J. Res. 1167 passes in the House 
by a vote of 191 to 33 and by voice vote in the Senate. H.J. 1167 provides for a cut off 
of military aid to Turkey until the President certifies to the Congress that Turkey was 
in compliance with American foreign aid laws and that substantial progress has been 
made regarding military forces in Cyprus. H.J. Res. 1167 also contained a provision 
that postpones the ban on military aid to Turkey until Dec. 10, 1974, unless Turkey 
violates the Cyprus cease fire, increases its forces on Cyprus, or transfers any American 
"implements of war" to that island prior to that date. Id.; see also Oct. 18, 1974, at 
Al, col. 2. 
On October 18, 1974, President Ford signs H.R. Res. 1167 into Public Law 93-448. 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1974, at AS, col. 1. 
120 CONG. REC. 38,084 (1974). Senate passes, by a vote of 55 to 36, the Humphrey 
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 to delay the cut off of military aid 
and sales to Turkey until Feb. 5, 1975. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1974, at AS, col. 1. 
120 CONG. REC. 39,142 (1974). House of Representatives passes, by a vote of 297 to 
98, the DuPont-Rosenthal amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. The 
amendment is the same as the amendment in the continuing resolution on appropria-
tions. N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1974, at All, col. 1. 
120 CONG. REC. 40,385 (1974). Congress passes the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 
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acted Public Law 93-559 signed by President Ford on December 30, 
1974, which contained provisions imposing an embargo on all mili-
tary assistance and military sales to Turkey starting February 5, 1975, 
until "the President determines and certifies to the Congress that ... 
Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the 
Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under 
such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been 
made regarding military forces in Cyprus. " 58 
The course of the congressional debate and Administration com-
ments reveal the polarity of their positions on the issue of further aid 
to Turkey. On August 14, 197 4, Congressmen John Brademas, Peter 
Kyros, Gus Y atron, Paul Sarbanes and Skip Bafalis introduced House 
Resolution 1319 expressing the sense of Congress "that all U.S. eco-
nomic and military assistance and military sales to Turkey should im-
mediately be stopped until all Turkish armed forces have been 
withdrawn from Cyprus."59 
On August 19, 197 4, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger held a 
press conference during which reporter James McCartney asked Kis-
singer "whether the Foreign Assistance Act did not require the cutoff 
of American aid to Turkey as a result of its aggression in Cyprus. " 60 
Kissinger replied "I will have to get a legal opinion on that subject, 
which I have not done."61 
George Ball, former Under Secretary of State (1961-1966), testi-
fied before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe on 
with an amendment requiring the President to suspend all military assistance or sales of 
defense articles, as well as the issuance of any licenses for transportation of arms, am-
munition and implements of war to Turkey. A provision authorizes the President to 
resume assistance if he determines that the government of Turkey is in compliance with 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and 
any agreement entered into under such acts, and that substantial progress is made to-
ward an agreement regarding military forces on Cyprus. (The amendment is the same 
as the amendment in the continuing resolution on appropriations). Congress authorizes 
the President to suspend the effective cut-off date until February 5, 1975 if he deter-
mines that such suspension could further negotiations for a peaceful solution to the 
Cyprus conflict. Twenty-five million dollars in humanitarian assistance is authorized 
for Cyprus. N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1974, at Al, col. 1. 
President Ford signs the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 into law (Pub. L. 93-559). 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1974, at A3, col. 7. 
58. Act of Dec. 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, (1974) U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 
(90 stat.) 2072-73, 6742-43, 6742-43. 
59. 120 CONG. REC. 28,306 (1974); Cyprus - 1974, Hearings Before the House Comm. on 
Foreign Affairs and its Subcomm. on Europe, 93rd Cong., 2nd. Sess. 83 (1974) (statement of 
Rep. John Brademas) [hereinafter Cyprus Hearings]. 
60. Kissinger press conference, Aug. 19, 1974, referred to in STERN, supra note 20, at 142. 
61. Cyprus Hearings, supra note 59, at 57. 
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August 20, 1974, that he would support legislation calling for a halt in 
military assistance to Turkey until an agreement acceptable to all par-
ties was reached regarding the presence of foreign military forces on 
Cyprus.62 
On August 29, 1974, the sponsors of House Resolution 1319 
wrote to Secretary Kissinger that Turkey had violated United States 
laws and was "immediately ineligible for further assistance. "63 A 
week later, a State Department official confidentially informed Sena-
tor Thomas F. Eagleton's chief foreign policy aide, Brian Atwood, 
"that the legal study of the Turkish military aid question had been 
completed in the Office of the Legal Advisor" and that "[i]ts conclu-
sion was that by no stretch of the statutes or the legal imagination of 
the State Department's attorneys could military aid to Turkey be con-
tinued. "64 The official said: 
he could not understand why the highest level of government could 
still not obey the law [and] that pressure was being applied at the top 
of the department to modify the conclusions more to the tactical re-
quirements of Kissinger by returning the unsatisfactory opinion to 
the staff for revision. The message, as read by Eagleton's staff, was 
that an attempt was being made to fiddle with the legal opinion and 
the State Department staff was holding firm to ·its position. 6s 
On September 5, 1974, Eagleton initiated in the Senate the rule of law 
debate regarding Turkey by a statement he delivered on the the Sen-
ate floor. 
On September 19, 1974 Kissinger appeared before a Senate Dem-
ocratic Caucus (at his request) prior to a vote on Senate Resolution 
1897, a non-binding sense of Congress resolution, that military aid 
and sales to Turkey be immediately suspended until Turkey complied 
with United States laws. Kissinger argued against the resolution. 
However, "during an exchange with Senator Eagleton ... [Kissinger] 
admitted that the 'dominant interpretation within my legal depart-
ment' agreed with Eagleton's contention that aid to Turkey is illegal 
since its invasion of Cyprus employed U.S.-supplied weapons which, 
under the aid legislation, can only be used for defensive purposes. "66 
Kissinger added that in his view there were times in world history 
62. Id. at 49-50. 
63. 120 CONG. REC. 30,700 (1974). 
64. STERN, supra note 20, at 143-44. 
65. Id. 
66. Cyprus Hearings, supra note 59, at 59; see also STERN, supra note 20, at 145; N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 20, 1974, at A4, col. 2; Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1974, at Al, col. 1. 
19
Rossides: Cyprus and the Rule of Law
Published by SURFACE, 1991
40 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 17:21 
when diplomats had to act outside the law. 67 Despite requests from 
the Congress, Kissinger refused to transmit a copy of the State De-
partment's legal opinion to the Congress.68 The resolution passed by 
a vote of sixty-four to twenty-seven. 
The Comptroller General of the United States . also concluded 
that Turkey had violated section 505{d) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961 and section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act.69 In his 
opinion, the violation lay in the diversion of United States-supplied 
67. Telephone interviews with former Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo) (Oct. 3, 1990) 
and Brian Atwood, Sen. Eagleton's chief foreign policy legislative assistant (Sept. 19, 1990). 
68. Kissinger ordered the State Department to withhold the release of a departmental 
legal ruling on whether Turkey was in violation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, and of the Foreign Military Sales Act with respect to Turkey's use of United States 
furnished arms in its invasion and occupation of Cyprus. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1974, at A7, col. 
1. Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, Congressman Ben Rosenthal and others requested copies of 
the State Department's legal opinion to no avail. Stem wrote: "The legal study became a 
major point of contention in the recurrent jousts between the press office and the news media. 
Five months after the State Department's legal opinion was completed, the Department's 
spokesman Robert Anderson still found himself floundering with the issue. 'What is the justi-
fication,' one reporter asked in a heated exchange in February 1975, 'for keeping secret the 
results of a study that was ordered to determine whether or not a foreign government was in 
compliance with American law?' The study is not going to be made public Anderson said." 
STERN, supra note 20, at 143. Kissinger also refused to allow the Cyprus Desk Officer, 
Thomas A. Boyatt, to testify before congressional committees and refused to send to Congress 
a copy of Boyatt's memorandum in which he took issue with the direction of State Department 
policy on Cyprus. See Boyatt, 1974 In Retrospect and Its Importance Today, in THE RULE OF 
LAW, supra note 45, at 7. 
69. Opinion letter from Comptroller General to Senator Thomas F. Eagleton at 13, 16 
(Oct. 7, 1974) [hereinafter Opinion Letter]. At pages 2 and 3 of the opinion letter the follow-
ing provisions of the 1947 bilateral agreement are set forth: 
Article I states: 
The Government of the United States will furnish the Government of Turkey such 
assistance as the President of the United States may authorize to be provided in accord-
ance with the Act of Congress approved May 22, 1947, and any acts amendatory or 
supplementary thereto. The Government of Turkey will make effective use of any such 
assistance in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. 
The second paragraph of Article II states in part: 
The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the pur-
poses for which it has been accorded. (Emphasis in original.) 
Article IV of the Agreement states: 
Determined and equally interested to assure the security of any article, service, or 
information received by the Government of Turkey pursuant to this agreement, the 
Governments of the United States and Turkey will respectively take after consultation, 
such measures as the other government may judge necessary for this purpose. The 
Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the 
United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, with-
out such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such infor-
mation by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey 
or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished. 
(Emphasis in original). 
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military assistance for use in Cyprus without obtaining the prior for-
mal consent of the United States which was required by article IV of 
the July 1947 United States-Turkey bilateral agreement on Aid to 
Turkey.70 
The Comptroller General stated that subsection 505( d) of the 
Act also required a determination that the violations were "substan-
tial" in order to render a country "immediately ineligible for further 
assistance."71 He then stated that any diversion of a substantial 
amount of military supplies would "constitute a 'substantial' violation 
of Section 505( d)" and that he believed "Turkey had diverted sub-
stantial quantities of military assistance items. "72 
There was no real argument by the Administration supporters 
that Turkey had not violated the law. Instead, the Administration 
emphasized the strategic importance of Turkey and pressed for a sus-
pension of the cutoff of aid to Turkey to give Kissinger time to negoti-
ate. In asking for additional time, leading supporters of the 
Administration such as Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and 
Congressman John Anderson, admitted that the law had been broken. 
As Majority Leader Mansfield stated on the Senate floor: 
The position of the distinguished Senator from Missouri (Mr. 
Eagleton) which has won the overwhelming approval of Congress, is 
clear: These laws as applied to the hostilities on Cyprus require a 
cutoff of aid to Turkey. The foundation of this judgment is incontro-
vertible: This is a Nation of laws and not of men and when the law is 
clear, it must be followed whether it seems expedient or not at the 
time.73 
• • • • • 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 13. 
72. Id. at 15. The Comptroller General stated: 
Any diversion of substantial quantities of military assistance items furnished by the 
United States from authorized purposes would thus constitute a "substantial" violation 
of section 505(d) under the intent expressed in the House report. Moreover, even 
though any substantial diversion thus seems sufficient in and of itself to trigger section 
505(d), the purposes and use to which the diverted military assistance is applied would 
certainly also be relevant to the gravity of the violation. If such purposes and use [are] 
in contravention of the explicitly stated policies and purposes of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, the violation would undoubtedly be "substantial". It is our impression 
that Turkey has diverted substantial quantities of military assistance items furnished by 
the United States, although we have no official information as to the types and quanti-
ties of defense articles which are involved. In addition, as noted hereinbefore the par-
ticular purposes for which the items were diverted and the uses to which they were 
applied may well be in contravention of the policies and purposes of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961. 
73. 120 CONG. REC. 34,672 (1974). "[T]he legal case ... was sufficiently compelling so 
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The joint resolution suspends until December 15 the application of 
the cutoff of funds prescribed in the Foreign Military Sales Act and 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended .... But in doing so, 
it acknowledges that these laws clearly prescribe a cutoff. 74 
The New York Times in a series of editorials in September and 
October of 1974, condemned Kissinger's failure to apply the law man-
dating the cutoff of military aid to Turkey in response to its invasion 
of Cyprus. The editorials state in part: 
Turkey ls Ineligible 
Cutting off American military aid to Turkey may, as Secretary 
of State Kissinger contends, be "ineffective and counterproductive" 
so far as getting the Turks to roll back their occupation of Cyprus is 
concerned; but it is mandatory under the law. In pretending for 
nearly a month to be studying this question, the State Department is 
clearly stalling, as it has stalled at every point since the outset of the 
Cyprus tragedy when action was called for to demonstrate this coun-
try's disapproval of aggression. 75 
Toward Cyprus Peace 
The overwhelming (307 to 90) approval by the House of a bind-
ing cutoff in military aid to Turkey until "substantial progress" is 
made toward a Cyprus settlement dramatizes American revulsion 
against the massive Turkish aggression on the island. The action was 
also aimed at forcing Administration compliance with laws that man-
date such a cutoff when a recipient country misuses American mili-
tary assistance. 76 
Turkey: Still Ineligible 
The virulent White House opposition to efforts by decisive ma-
jorities in both houses of Congress to suspend military aid to Turkey 
has no basis in either law or logic. President Ford's repeated threats 
to veto a bill requiring such a cutoff can only be seen as an attempt to 
block Congress from a meaningful role in the shaping of foreign pol-
icy and a move to fend off a blow at the prestige of Secretary of State 
Kissinger. 
• • • • • 
that Kissinger never, in the course of the harshest conflict he experienced with Congress, chose 
to defend his policies on legal grounds." STERN, supra note 20, at 149. 
74. 120 CONG. REC. 34,673 (1974). The statements took place during consideration of 
S.J. Res. 247, which authorized the President to suspend, in the case of Turkey, the application 
of the provisions of§ 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and § 3(c) of the Foreign 
Military Sales Act. 
75. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1974, at A28, col. 1. 
76. Id., Sept. 26, 1974, at A28, col. 1. 
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[T]he law is clear and it should be obeyed. Congress should 
stick to its guns on the military aid issue - veto or no veto. 77 
43 
The Administration introduced legislation 78 only three weeks af-
ter the law went into effect to modify the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 to allow arms shipments to Turkey. This action reflected the 
desire of the Administration to supply arms to Turkey regardless of 
its acts of aggression. Additionally, the Administration supported the 
amendment to section 505( d) that removed the mandatory nature of 
the sanction in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for misuse of 
United States-supplied defense articles. 79 
Cyrus Vance, who was later to become Secretary of State in the 
Carter Administration, and George Ball testified jointly before the 
House International Relations Committee80 on the Administration-
backed bill aimed at modifying the congressional arms embargo that 
Congress had enacted in the Fall of 1974.81 They stated their view 
that Turkey had violated the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the 
Foreign Military Sales Act, as well as the bilateral agreements under 
those Acts. They expressed their deep concern that a precedent was 
being set for other nations to disregard the conditions of our military 
assistance and military sales programs. They also urged action to re-
inforce the fundamental principles of our military aid programs -
namely that our arms are to be used for defensive purposes only and 
not for aggression, as Turkey had done. 82 They proposed a three-
month lifting of the embargo and its reimposition indefinitely if satis-
factory progress had not been made to resolve the problem. 83 
Ball and Vance stated: 
Our one safeguard is that most of these arms are provided under 
explicit conditions that they will be used only for the purposes for 
which they are explicitly provided, which are solely for internal se-
curity, legitimate self-defense and to permit the recipient country to 
participate in collective security arrangements consistent with the 
77. Id., Oct. 13, 1974, at Al6, col. 1. 
78. Id., Feb. 27, 1975, at AS, col. 1. 
79. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Congress passed the law in 1976. 
80. The name of the committee had been changed from the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. It was changed back to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, effective February 5, 
1979, by House Resolution 89, 96th Congress. 
81. Suspension of Prohibitions Against Military Assistance to Turkey, 1975: Hearing on S. 
846, H.R. 8454 and other bills and resolutions Before the House Committee on International 
Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1975) [hereinafter Suspension of Prohibitions] (statements 
of George Ball and Cyrus Vance). See also N.Y. Times, July 11, 1975, at A2, col. 3. 
82. See Suspension of Prohibitions, supra note 81, at 45-72. 
83. Id. at 49, SO, 53, 56, 61, 63. 
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United Nations Charter which, of course, includes NATO. But that 
raises the central question: How can we preserve the credibility of 
these conditions if we are prepared to ignore them in the case of Tur-
key in a highly visible situation which all the world is watching? 
That Turkey used the arms we provided in violation of the rele-
vant American laws and of the express language of the bilateral agree-
ment that governed their transfer is not in dispute. That issue has been 
settled by an opinion of the Comptroller General in unequivocal 
language. 
The question now is: Should the Congress wipe out the penalties 
of violation which, in express terms, would render Turkey ineligible 
for further American weapons until the Turkish Government takes 
steps to purge itself by some serious move to settle its dispute with 
Greece and to remove its troops from Cyprus? To do so might dan-
gerously undercut the conditions we have imposed on the use of all 
the arms we have provided up to this point under our various mili-
tary aid and military sales programs. 
• • • • • 
Finally, and in many ways this is the most important point, we 
are seriously concerned that this so-called compromise would create 
a widespread impression that no nation that has acquired arms from 
the United States need any longer pay attention to the conditions on 
which those arms were made available but would be free to use them 
in pursuit of its own interests in local conflicts. 84 
After persistent pressure from the Administration, Congress partially 
lifted the embargo on October 2, 197 5 and the remaining restrictions 
in August 1978. ss 
84. Id. at 46, 48 (emphasis added). 
85. Pub. L. 94-104 (1975). On July 24, 1975, the House of Representatives defeated the 
Administration's proposal, S. 846, to lift the embargo on the sale of American arms to Turkey 
by a vote of 223 to 206. 121 CONG. REC. 24480-526 (1975). The Senate had passed S. 846, by a 
vote of 41 to 40, in May, 1975. 121 CONG. REC. 24,526 (1975); N.Y. Times, July 25, 1975, at 
A 1, col. 1. The Administration had a new bill introduced in the Senate, S. 2230, which passed 
in late July by a vote of 47 to 46. Following the August recess, the House Committee on 
International Relations passed S. 2230 by a vote of 20 to 9 on September 17, 1975. On October 
2, 1975, the House of Representatives passed S. 2230 by a vote of 237 to 176 which partially 
lifted the embargo for arms contracted by Turkey prior to the imposition of the embargo and 
permitted the issuance of licenses in connection with commercial sales. It did not authorize 
any military grant assistance and delayed resumption of government-to-government credit 
sales until enactment of new foreign military sales legislation for fiscal year 1976. 121 CONG. 
REC. 31457-60 (19J°5); N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1975, at Al, col. 8. President Ford signed S. 2230 
on October 7, 1975. The embargo was fully lifted in August, 1978, following intense pressure 
from the Carter Administration. The Senate passed repeal legislation on July 25, 1978 by a 
vote of 57 to 42. 124 CONG. REC. 22510-57 (1978). On August l, 1978, the House voted 208 
to 205 to repeal the remaining rule-of-law embargo. As a presidential candidate, Carter had 
specifically endorsed U.N.G.A. Res. 3212, stating that: "Peace must be based on the United 
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3. Bilateral Agreements on Aid to Turkey 
The Agreement on Aid to Turkey of July 1947, was entered into 
pursuant to the act of May 22, 194 7. This act is a "predecessor for-
eign assistance act"86 under section 505( d) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961. Therefore, military assistance to Turkey under the 194 7 
agreement has been subject to the terms of section 505( d). Violation 
of the agreement would render Turkey immediately ineligible for fur-
ther assistance, as would violation of the Act itself. 
The 1947 agreement required United States consent for any use 
of military assistance outside the specific purposes for which assist-
ance was given. Thus, United States consent was required for Turkish 
deployment of United States military assistance in 1974.87 The 
United States and Turkey entered into another agreement by an ex-
change of notes dated May 16, 1960 and June 16, 1960, in which the 
United States consented to a Turkish request to use certain American-
supplied military assistance program materiel for Turkey's 650 man 
military force in Cyprus. 88 The agreement clearly establishes and 
confirms that Turkey cannot use or deploy American military assist-
ance in Cyprus without the formal consent of the United States. 89 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3212of1 November 1974 endorsed by Cyprus, Greece 
and Turkey, calling among other things for the removal of all foreign military forces from 
Cyprus." Carter further said that the United States must work "to insure the independence, 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus," that Greek Cypriot refugees should be allowed 
"to return to their homes," that the "United States must pursue a policy based on principle 
and in accord with the rule of law" and that "[i]f I am elected president I intend to enforce and 
carry out the provisions of my statement." Statement and speech by James Carter in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Sept. 16, 1976). 
Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan stated that President Carter had "reneged on his 
[campaign] pledges" regarding Cyprus. Candidate Reagan stated: "The tragic situation in 
Cyprus has lasted six years. It must not continue. The foreign military forces on that island 
should be substantially reduced, and Cypriot refugees, be they Greek or Turkish, should be 
permitted to return to their homes and land. I support the full implementation of unanimously 
approved United Nations Resolution 3212 of November 1974 which 'Calls upon all States to 
respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic 
of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it; Urges the speedy 
withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the 
Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs.' " Reagan-Bush 
Committee news release (Sept. 26, 1980). President Reagan did not follow through on his 
pledge. 
86. See Opinion Letter, supra note 69, at 3. 
87. Id. 
88. The Treaty of Alliance, one of three treaties comprising the London-Zurich Agree-
ments, authorized 950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops to be stationed on Cyprus. The 
Treaty of Alliance, reprinted in ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, CYPRUS: 
THE DISPUTE AND THE SETTLEMENT 72-120 (1959) [hereinafter Treaty of Alliance]. 
89. The exchange of notes is reprinted in Hearings on United States Security Agreements 
and Commitments Abroad, Greece and Turkey, Before the Subcommittee on United States Se-
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Consent was granted, limited to specified types and quantities of de-
fense articles. The United States Ambassador's Note of May 16, 1960 
added: "The materiel to be deployed initially to Cyprus has been 
agreed upon . . . and is listed in the attached schedule and any Mili-
tary Assistance Program materiel Turkey may subsequently wish to 
deploy to Cyprus will have to be the subject of a separate request. "90 
In 1964 Turkey's threat to intervene militarily in Cyprus brought 
a written response from President Lyndon Johnson to the Turkish 
Prime Minister, in a letter dated June 5, 1964, which stated in part: 
I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the 
bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field 
of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Tur-
key of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United 
States consent in the use of military assistance for purposes other 
than those for which assistance was furnished. Your Government 
has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you 
fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the 
United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied 
military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus, under pres-
ent circumstances.9t 
It is interesting to note that following President Johnson's letter of 
June 5, 1964, Turkey did not intervene militarily in Cyprus in 1964. 
In his legal opinion of the status of the Turkish action in Cyprus 
in 1974 under United States law, the Comptroller General noted that 
such use of United States military assistance was not provided for 
under either the 1947 or 1960 agreements or the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961. 92 Therefore, he concluded, such use constituted a diver-
sion of assistance from its intended purpose for which consent was 
required prior to deployment. 93 The fact that consent was neither 
sought nor granted rendered the Turkish use of United States assist-
ance in Cyprus violative of the 194 7 and 1960 agreements as well as 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 because use went beyond that au-
thorized by the 1960 agreement. 94 The violation, believed by the 
Comptroller General to be substantial in terms of quantity and pur-
pose, fell clearly within the scope of the penalty clause of section 
curity Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
91st. Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 7, 1780 (1970). 
90. See Opinion Letter, supra note 69, at 4. 
91. Id. at 6. 
92. Id. at 12. 
93. Id. 
94. See Opinion Letter, supra note 69, at 13. 
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505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act.95 
. The illegal Turkish use of United States military equipment is 
underscored by an advisory legal opinion in 197 4 by the Congres-
sional Research Service as well as by the public's and the United Na-
tions' responses to Turkey's aggression. 
The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, 
in response to an inquiry from Congressman Brademas, concluded 
that section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act was mandatory in 
nature and that while "Congress provided little or no guidance for 
clearly distinguishing between" defensive and aggressive purposes, 
"[i]t is not unlikely that Congress had common sense standards in 
mind, i.e., general notions of the differences between offense and de-
fense."96 Turkey's aggressive actions were "highly visible," as Ball 
and Vance stated in their testimony, and fully reported in the media 
to the world community. 
Additional support for the proposition that Turkey's use of force 
in Cyprus was illegal comes from the United Nations Security Coun-
cil resolutions such as those passed on the day of Turkey's invasion of 
Cyprus, and on the date of Turkey's second aggression, calling for the 
recognition of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity 
of Cyprus and for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops not 
authorized by international treaty. Although these resolutions deal 
with the United Nations Charter and not United States laws, they do 
pertain to the question of the illegal use of force. 
The violations by Turkey of United States laws are clear, blatant 
and "highly visible." The problem that needs to be addressed is how 
to enforce our laws in the realm of foreign affairs as efficaciously as we 
do in domestic matters. 
B. United Nations Charter and Resolutions 
1. United Nations Charter 
A fundamental purpose of the United Nations Charter is to keep 
the peace and to prevent aggression, i.e., to settle problems peacefully. 
The preamble of the United Nations Charter states in part that the 
basic aims of the Organization are: 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women 
and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under 
95. Id. 
96. 120 CONG. REC. 30,700 (1974). 
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which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained, and ... to en-
sure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, 
that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest. 
Paragraph 1 of article 1 on the purposes of the United Nations 
Charter states that one purpose is: 
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that 
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention 
and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to 
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or set-
tlement of international disputes or situations which might 
lead to a breach of the peace; 
Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Charter, which set forth the 
principles to be acted upon to achieve the purposes proclaimed in arti-
cle 1, state: 
(3) All Members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 
and security, and justice, are not endangered. 
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. 
Article 51 of the Charter deals with individual and collective self-
defense and states in part: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. 
Turkey's use of military force to invade and occupy a large part 
of Cyprus directly violated the plain meaning of these provisions of 
the United Nations Charter, especially the sections that call for pacific 
methods of dispute resolution without resort to the use of force. 
Turkey's actions could not be interpreted as individual self-de-
fense under article 51 since, of course, Turkey was not attacked, nor 
was she under threat of attack. Similarly, collective self-defense was 
inapplicable. Furthermore, the principle of self-defense does not al-
low for defense of foreign nationals. The Turkish Cypriots are citi-
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zens of Cyprus and Turkey cannot justify the invasion on the grounds 
of protecting the Turkish Cypriots. 
Similarly, article 53 of the Charter, which permits the Security 
Council to use regional arrangements for enforcement action, is not 
available to Turkey. Even if the London-Zurich Agreements among 
Britain, Greece and Turkey were to be considered a regional arrange-
ment, article 53 states that "no enforcement action shall be taken 
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the au-
thorization of the Security Council." 
Turkey continues to be in violation of the United Nations Char-
ter, whose key precepts are universally accepted as preemptory legal 
norms. As Sir David Hunt, former British High Commissioner in 
Cyprus, stated: 
But the rule of law, as both philosophers and practical statesmen 
agree, can only be established when there are institutions to formu-
late it and maintain it. Almost as essential is for it to be universally 
recognized. These conditions have now prevailed for thirty-five 
years. The basis of international law is formulated in the Charter of 
the United Nations; and the same document provides for the organs 
to enforce it. All the sovereign nations of the world have voluntarily 
undertaken to observe the obligations which the Charter lays on 
them: that disputes are to be settled by peaceful means; that mem-
bers undertake not to use force or the threat of force in contravention 
of the purposes of the United Nations; and that each member must 
assist the organisation in any action it takes under the Charter. 
• • • • • 
[T]here is a rule of law in the world and the guarantee of it is the 
United Nations. Applying these principles to the case of Cyprus it is 
clear and undeniable that the government of Turkey, by invading 
with military force the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, is in open 
and deliberate breach of the Charter. 97 
2. United Nations Resolutions Against Turkey's Aggression 
The United Nations Security Council and General Assembly 
passed a number of resolutions following Turkey's invasion of Cy-
prus. In summation, the resolutions called upon all states to respect 
the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus, de-
97. HUNT, CYPRUS: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 10 (1980)(Sir David 
Hunt, the 1980 Montague Burton Lecture on International Relations in the University of Ed-
inburgh)[hereinafter HUNT]. Hunt was Britain's High Commissioner in Cyprus from 1965 to 
1966. 
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mantled the immediate end to foreign intervention, and requested that 
foreign military forces withdraw without delay. 98 The resolutions are 
either explicitly or implicitly premised on the judgment of the Secur-
ity Council and General Assembly that Turkey is in violation of the 
United Nations Charter. 
Since 1964, over seventy United Nations Security Council resolu-
tions involving Cyprus have been passed dealing with substantive 
matters and with periodic extensions of the United Nations Peace-
Keeping Force. The more relevant Security Council resolutions 
passed before Turkey's invasion of Cyprus are Resolution 186 (Mar. 
4, 1964), Resolution 193 (Aug. 9, 1964) and Resolution 244 (Dec. 22, 
1967). 
Security Council Resolution 186, passed two-and-a-half months 
after the intercommunal fighting started, referred to the relevant pro-
visions of the Charter, quoted in full article 2, paragraph 4 that pros-
cribes the "threat or use of force," and recommended the creation of a 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus and the designation 
of a mediator.99 A United Nations Force was created, which became 
98. The Security Council resolutions refer to the removal of foreign military forces except 
those authorized by international treaty. The Treaty of Alliance, supra note 88, authorized 
950 Greek personnel and 650 Turkish personnel only. Unanimous G.A. Res. 3212 (Nov. 1, 
1974) refers to the removal of all foreign military forces. G.A. Res. 3212, 29 U.N. GAOR 
(2275th plenary mtg.) at 3, U.N. Doc. S/11557 (1974) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 3212]. 
99. S.C. Res. 186, 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (1102d mtg.) at 102, U.N. Doc. S/5575 (1964); 
see also 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1964) at 105, U.N. Doc. S/5679 (1964). S.C. Res. 
186 reads as follows: 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 
Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten inter-
national peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are 
promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution, 
Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the Treaties signed at 
Nicosia on 16 August 1960, 
Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and 
its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or polit-
ical independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the United Nations," 
1. Calls upon all member states, in conformity with their obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action to worsen 
the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace; 
2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the mainte-
nance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to 
stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus; 
3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost 
restraint; 
4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a 
United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the force 
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operational on March 27, 1964, and a mediator was appointed. 
Security Council Resolution 193 reiterated the "urgent appeal to 
the Government of Turkey to cease instantly the bombardment of and 
the use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Gov-
ernment of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to 
cease firing immediately .... "and called for an "immediate cease-fire 
by all concerned."100 
There were several key Security Council resolutions following 
Turkey's invasion. Resolution 353,101 adopted July 20, 1974, the day 
of Turkey's invasion called "upon all states to respect the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus," called for a cease-
fire, demanded "an immediate end to foreign military intervention" in 
Cyprus and requested "the withdrawal without delay . . . of foreign 
Id. 
shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of 
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The commander of the force shall 
be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who 
shall keep the Governments providing the force fully informed, shall report periodically 
to the Security Council on its operation; 
5. Recommends that the function of the force should be, in the interest of pre-
serving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of 
fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and 
order and a return to normal conditions; 
6. Recommends that the stationing of the force shall be for a period of three 
months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by 
the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The 
Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose; 
7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with 
the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom a mediator who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the 
communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promot-
ing a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of 
the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and secur-
ity. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts; 
8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, 
as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff. 
100. See S.C. Res. 193, 19 U.N. SCOR Supp. 1 (1143rd mtg.) at 152, U.N. Doc. S/5868 
(1964) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 193]. 
101. See S.C. Res. 353, supra note 12. S.C. Res. 353 reads as follows: 
THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General at its 1979th meeting about 
the recent developments in Cyprus, 
Having heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and 
the statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other member 
countries, 
Having considered at its present meeting further developments on the island, 
Deeply deploring the outbreak of violence and continuing bloodshed, 
Gravely concerned about the situation which led to a serious threat to international 
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military personnel" except those present under international agree-
ment. Resolution 354 (July 23, 1974) demanded immediate compli-
ance with Security Council Resolution 353, paragraph 2, which called 
for a cease-fire; Resolution 357 (Aug. 14, 1974) deplored the resump-
tion of fighting, once again demanded a cease-fire and called for re-
sumption of negotiations; Resolution 358 (Aug. 15, 1974) deplored 
the noncompliance with Resolution 357 and "insist[ed] on the full 
implementation" of its resolutions 353, 354 and 357 "with the imme-
diate and strict observance of the cease-fire"; Resolution 359 (Aug. 
15, 1974) discussed casualties in the United Nations Peace-Keeping 
Force in Cyprus; Resolution 360 (Aug. 16, 1974) in which the Secur-
ity Council "[r]ecorded its formal disapproval of the unilateral mili-
tary actions" by Turkey against Cyprus and urged compliance with 
previous resolutions "including those concerning the withdrawal 
without delay ... of foreign military personnel" except those present 
under international agreements; Resolution 361 (Aug. 30, 1974) cov-
ered "the plight of the refugees," urging "appropriate measures to 
provide for their relief and welfare and to permit persons who wish to 
Id. 
peace and security, and which created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern 
Mediterranean area, 
Equally concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the 
Republic of Cyprus, established and guaranteed by international agreement, 
Recalling Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolu-
tions of the Security Council on this matter, 
Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations: 
1. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Cyprus; 
2. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and 
requests all states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which 
might further aggravate the situation; 
3. Demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of 
Cyprus that is in contravention of operative paragraph 1; 
4. Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign 
military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agree-
ments including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Repub-
lic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974; 
5. Calls on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North-
ern Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the 
area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General in-
formed; 
6. Calls on all parties to cooperate fully with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out 
its mandate; 
7. Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-
General to report as appropriate with a view of adopting further measures in order to 
ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible. 
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do so to return to their homes in safety," and noting that the United 
Nations High Commissioner has already been appointed as Coordina-
tor of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus; and Res-
olution 365 (Dec. 13, 1974) which endorsed the unanimous General 
Assembly Resolution 3212 on the "Question of Cyprus" and urged 
"the parties concerned to implement it as soon as possible." 
General Assembly Resolution 3212102 was unanimously passed 
on November 1, 1974. Among other things, Resolution 3212 
"[c]all[ed] upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, 
territorial integrity and non-alignment of ... Cyprus" and "[u]rge[d] 
the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military 
102. See G.A. Res. 3212, supra note 98. G.A. Res. 3212 reads as follows: 
THE GENERAL AssEMBLY, 
Having considered the question of Cyprus, 
Gravely concerned about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security, 
Mindful of the need to solve this crisis without delay by peaceful means, in accord-
ance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, 
Having heard the statements in the debate and taking note of the Report of the 
Special Political Committee on the question of Cyprus: 
1. Calls upon all states to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integ-
rity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and 
interventions directed against it; 
2. Urges the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military 
presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign 
interference in its affairs; 
3. Considers that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns 
the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities; 
4. Commends the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, 
with the good offices of the Secretary-General between the representatives of the two 
communities, and calls for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually 
acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights; 
5. Considers that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls 
upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end; 
6. Expresses the hope that, if necessary, further efforts including negotiations can 
take place, within the framework of the United Nations, for the purpose of implement-
ing the provisions of the present resolution, thus ensuring to the Republic of Cyprus its 
fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide United Nations human-
itarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus and calls upon all states to 
contribute to that effort; 
8. Calls upon all parties to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations 
Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, which may be strengthened if necessary; 
9. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to lend his good offices to the par-
ties concerned; 
10. Further requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the 
attention of the Security Council. 
G.A. Res. 3212 was endorsed by the Security Council (S.C. Res. 365) on Dec. 13, 1974. 
Id. 
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presence and personnel from ... Cyprus, and the cessation of all for-
eign interference in its affairs." 
To date, Turkey has failed to comply with these United Nations 
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and continues to 
violate them. 103 
3. United Nations Resolutions on Missing Persons in Cyprus 
One of the most tragic aspects of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus is 
the unknown fate of missing persons. The Cypriot government identi-
fied 1614 missing Greek Cypriots and five missing American citizens 
of Greek Cypriot descent. 
The United Nations passed several resolutions on the issue of 
missing persons. General Assembly Resolution 3450, passed on De-
cember 9, 1975, requested "the Secretary-General to exert every effort 
in close cooperation with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in assisting the tracing and accounting for missing persons as a 
result of armed conflict in Cyprus" and to provide the Commission on 
Human Rights information as to the implementation of this resolu-
tion. Third Committee Resolutions104 of December 12, 1977 re-
quested the Secretary-General "to support the establishment of an 
Investigatory Body." A year later, the Third Committee regretted the 
delay and urged the establishment of an investigatory body. A third 
resolution, on December 4, 1981, welcomed "the agreement establish-
ing the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus," regretted "that 
due to procedural difficulties no progress has been achieved towards 
the commencement of the Committee's investigative work," and 
urged "the Committee to proceed, without any further delay, with its 
investigative work for the tracing of and accounting for missing per-
sons in Cyprus." A resolution of the Human Rights Commission 
adopted on October 3, 1981 protested "attempts to settle ... Varosha 
[Famagusta] ... as illegal and called for immediate cessation of such 
activities," called for "the tracing of and accounting for missing per-
sons ... without any further delay," proclaimed that the Commission 
is "alarmed by the ... influx of great numbers of settlers," and called 
for "the freedom of movement, the freedom of settlement and the 
right to property" for all Cypriots. Finally, General Assembly Reso-
lution of December 17, 1982 expressed "concern that the Committee 
103. See Van Wynen Thomas & Thomas, The Cyprus Crisis 1974-75: Political-Juridical 
Aspects, 29 SW. L.J. 513, 543-46 (1975) [hereinafter Van Wynen Thomas & Thomas). 
104. See United Nations Committee on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs (Third 
Committee). 
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on Missing Persons ... has failed to overcome procedural difficulties 
and has achieved no progress towards the commencement of its inves-
tigative work." 
Turkey has also failed to comply with the resolutions on missing 
persons. In regard to the United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, 
Hunt stated: 
In the case of Cyprus the Security Council has spoken, on behalf of 
its members who are bound by its decision. In a series of resolutions 
dating since July 1974 it has laid down the requirements of jus-
tice .... I can summarize everything that matters under two heads: 
after calling on all states to respect the sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity of Cyprus the Council demands an immediate end 
to foreign intervention and the withdrawal without delay of foreign 
military personnel. The two parts hang together. A state cannot ex-
ercise its sovereignty, and its territorial integrity is violated, when 
part of its territory is under foreign military occupation. And the use 
of force, condemned by the Charter and renounced by all members of 
the United Nations, cannot be brought to an end until its instruments 
are withdrawn to the place from which the aggression was 
launched. 10s 
C. London-Zurich Agreements (1959-1960), Including 
the Treaty of Guarantee 106 
Turkey has stated she had the right to invade Cyprus under arti-
cle IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, one of the three treaties under the 
London-Zurich Agreements of 1959-1960. Before discussing the va-
lidity of Turkey's contention, it is important to note that the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign Military Sales Act make no 
exception for, and are not subject to, the provisions of the Treaty of 
Guarantee. Whether or not Turkey had the right to use force in Cy-
prus under article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey nevertheless 
violated United States laws and the bilateral agreements under those 
laws. Similarly, the United Nations Charter does not permit an ex-
ception under the Treaty of Guarantee. 
The 1959-1960 London-Zurich Agreements comprise three trea-
ties: ( 1) the Treaty of Establishment between Britain and Cyprus 
transferred sovereignty over the island, except for ninety-nine square 
miles retained by Britain to be used for military purposes (known as 
105. See HUNT, supra note 97, at 12. 
106. Conference on Cyprus, CMND. 679 (1959). See also Cyprus, CMND. 1993 (1960). 
The Treaty of Guarantee is in CMND. 1253 (1961). The Treaty of Establishment is in 
CMND. 1252 (1961). 
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The Sovereign Base Areas); (2) the Treaty of Alliance among Cyprus, 
Greece and Turkey established a tripartite headquarters and author-
ized the presence of 950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops on Cy-
prus; and (3) the Treaty of Guarantee among Britain, Greece and 
Turkey contained the ban on enosis (union with Greece) and 
partition. 
Article IV, the final article of the Treaty of Guarantee, is the 
article relied on by the Turkish government to justify its use of force 
and invasion of Cyprus. It reads: 
In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, 
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult to-
gether with respect to the representations or measures necessary to 
ensure observance of those provisions. 
Insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, 
each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take ac-
tion with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by 
the present Treaty .101 
According to Hunt, the second sentence was added at the insistence 
of Turkey .108 
Not only did the London-Zurich Agreements not authorize Tur-
key's use of force to invade Cyprus, but, as will be discussed, the 
Treaty of Guarantee, on its face, indicts Turkey. Turkey's argument 
that the Treaty of Guarantee, and in particular article IV, gave her 
the right to intervene in Cyprus with the use of force is untenable for 
a number of reasons: 
(1) Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee did not authorize 
"force" when it authorized "action." There is no mention of the word 
"force" in the Treaty. 
(2) When Cyprus became a member of the United Nations in 
1960, all provisions of the London-Zurich Agreements in conflict with 
or inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations became null 
and void pursuant to article 103 of the United Nations Charter. Arti-
cle 103 states: "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of 
the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and 
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obli-
gations under the present Charter shall prevail." If an interpretation 
of article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee could be made to justify the 
use of force then all or part of article IV used to justify force is in 
107. See id. 
108. See HUNT, supra note 97, at 8. 
36
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1991], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol17/iss1/3
1991] Cyprus and the Rule of Law 57 
conflict and inconsistent with article 103 of the United Nations Char-
ter and, consequently, is void ab initio. 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, states that member 
states "shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force." Article 51 of 
the Charter authorizes the use of force for purposes of self-defense 
only. Turkey cannot avail herself of article 51 since she was not at-
tacked nor was she threatened with attack. 
Additionally, the use of force is permitted under the Charter in 
article 53 in the chapter on Regional Arrangements. Article 53 is also 
not available to Turkey since the Treaty of Guarantee is not a regional 
arrangement under article 53. Even if the Treaty of Guarantee is con-
sidered a regional arrangement, article 53 states that "no enforcement 
action shall be taken under regional arrangements . . . without the 
authorization of the Security Council." 
Professor R.St.J. MacDonald concludes that article IV "to the 
extent that it purports to authorize the use of armed force, is inconsis-
tent" 109 with the United Nations Charter and void. He writes: 
I thus reach the following conclusions: that obligations imposed 
by Article 2(4) have not been discharged on the basis of frustration, 
that by virtue of Article 103, Charter obligations prevail over treaty 
rights as well as treaty obligations, and that for one obligation to pre-
vail over another inconsistent obligation is for it to render the latter 
invalid or void. Therefore, subject to what is said below on Article 
51, Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, to the extent that it purports 
to authorize the use of armed force, is inconsistent with Article 2(4) 
of the Charter and does not fall within the Article 53 exception. 
Even if the 1974 invasion was in compliance with Article 4, such 
compliance was not sufficient to render it legal. 110 
• • • • • 
CONCLUSION ON THE LEGALITY OF THE TURKISH INVASION: 
On the basis of the following reasoning, I conclude that the 1974 
invasion of Cyprus was in contravention of international law: for an 
invasion to be legal, it must be consistent with the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter, whether express or implied; compliance 
with a treaty, on its own, is insufficient to render an invasion consis-
tent with Article 2(4) of the Charter; the 1974 invasion was not in 
compliance with Article 53 of the Charter on regional arrangements, 
as it is doubtful that a regional arrangement was in being, and, in any 
109. MacDonald, International Law and the Conflict in Cyprus, 19 CANADIAN Y.B. OF 
INT'L L. 3, 3-48 ( 1981 ). MacDonald and Hunt refer to article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee 
as article 4, using the arabic. The Treaty uses article IV, the roman. 
110. Id. at 16. 
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event, prior authorization of the Security Council was not obtained 
for an enforcement action; there is no implied exception to Article 
2(4) in regard to quasi-regional arrangements according to which en-
forcement action may be taken until the Security Council states 
otherwise; there is no implied exception to Article 2( 4) in regard to 
the right to protect "legitimate interests"; that is, no implied right of 
self-help; the invasion was not in compliance with Article 51 on indi-
vidual self-defense, as there was no armed attack on Turkey; if the 
customary right of anticipatory self-defense or the right to protect 
nationals are implied exceptions to Article 2( 4), the factual require-
ments for the exercise of such rights were not satisfied; the invasion 
was not in compliance with Article 51 on collective self-defense as the 
Republic of Cyprus did not request Turkish aid; if there are implied 
exceptions to Article 2( 4) in regard to the right of humanitarian in-
tervention or the right to aid a people to achieve self-determination, 
they are not appropriate rights to invoke to justify the 1974 invasion, 
which was prompted not by international strife but by the Greek 
coup d'etat. In reaching the conclusion that the 1974 invasion con-
travened international law, it should be emphasized that reliance has 
been placed on the provisions of the Charter rather than on any spe-
cific resolutions of the General Assembly or the Security Council. 111 
Hunt also takes the position that the language and provisions of 
the Charter prevail over the Treaty of Guarantee. He said: 
There is, however, a more fundamental objection to be brought 
against the Turkish thesis than an argument based on the wording of 
this one particular article and its interpretation. This is that the 
Treaty of Guarantee lacks all legal validity. 
[T]his argument ... rests on the principle that the obligations which 
all nations have accepted voluntarily on their accession to the United 
Nations are superior to all other obligations. Where there are con-
flicts between them the Charter is a ms COGENS, laying down per-
emptory norms of international law from which no derogation is 
permitted. 
• • • • • 
There is therefore no escape from the two-pronged argument: first 
that Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee did not authorise the use of 
force; secondly that if force was sanctioned under that article, then 
the Treaty was void ab initio as inconsistent with the Charter. 112 
(3) On its face, the Treaty of Guarantee only authorized action 
111. Id. at 29-30. 
112. HUNT, supra note 97, at 11. See also Van Wynen Thomas & Thomas, supra note 
103, at 529-46; and Ehrlich, supra note 43, at 1066-79, regarding the August 1964 Turkish 
bombings of Cyprus. 
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to restore the status quo ante. Article IV states that the right to take 
action is for "the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created 
by the present Treaty." Throughout the ensuing seventeen years, 
Turkey demonstrated that she never had any such intention. As Hunt 
states: 
The parties announce that they reserve the right to take action. The 
nature of the action is undefined - there is certainly no reference to 
the use of force - but its purpose is defined, in restrictive terms, as 
having the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by 
the treaty. But neither in 1974 nor at any time since have the Turk-
ish government either professed or practised this aim. They have on 
the contrary presented as their aim a form of settlement wholly con-
trary to the one defined in the treaty, and specifically excluded by it: 
territorial partition and the creation of a separate Turkish-Cypriot 
state. 113 
Taylor G. Belcher, former United States Ambassador to Cyprus con-
curred in this view.114 
On August 13, 1974, three weeks after the legitimate government 
of Cyprus had been reinstated, Turkey issued a thirty-six hour ultima-
tum to Greece and Britain to accept Turkey's proposal for six sepa-
rate Turkish Cypriot "cantons" covering a third of Cyprus. The 
proposal was not to restore the status quo ante, but was tantamount to 
partition, which was barred by the London-Zurich Agreements. 
( 4) Turkey acted unilaterally in violation of the terms of the 
Treaty of Guarantee. Although Turkey apparently consulted with 
Britain, Turkey did not consult with Greece and therefore did not 
meet the requirements of article IV. 115 
(5) The Security Council preempted Turkey on March 4, 1964 
when it passed Resolution 186 following the outbreak of intercom-
munal fighting in December 1963. Resolution 186 led to the creation 
of a United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus116 and the 
designation of a mediator. Nevertheless, Turkey bombed northern 
Cyprus in August 1964. 117 The Security Council then authorized the 
Secretary-General "to make an appeal to the Government of Turkey 
to cease instantly the bombardment of and the use of military force of 
113. HUNT, supra note 97, at 11. 
114. See generally Cyprus and the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 45, at 
1. 
115. See Van Wynen Thomas & Thomas, supra note 103, at 542. 
116. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1964, at AS, col. 4. 
117. Id., Aug. 9, 1964, at Al, col. 8. 
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any kind against Cyprus .... "11s 
( 6) The Treaty of Alliance only allowed Turkey a force of 650 on 
Cyprus. 
(7) A normal rule of statutory interpretation is to choose the in-
terpretation which preserves the legality of the statute. Since the use 
of force by United Nations member states to settle disputes is so 
clearly contrary to the Charter, it is reasonable to assume that the 
parties did not mean to put an interpretation on the word "action" in 
the treaty contrary to a fundamental purp.ose of the Charter. 
D. North Atlantic Treaty 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a regional 
alliance created under article 52 of the United Nations Charter for 
collective defense against aggression under article 51 of the Charter. 
The fundamental principles, objectives and purposes of the North At-
lantic Treaty are to deter aggression and to support democratic gov-
ernment. The preamble and article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
state: 
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to 
live in peace with all peoples and all Governments. 
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heri-
tage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. 
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North At-
lantic area. 
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and 
for the preservation of peace and security. 
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty: 
ARTICLE 1 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be in-
volved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 
and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
Turkey violated article 1 of the North Atlantic Treaty by failing 
"to settle" the Cyprus problem "by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered" 
and also by her "use of force ... inconsistent with the purposes of the 
118. See S.C. Res. 193, supra note 100. 
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United Nations." Turkey also violated the policy set forth in the 
NATO preamble. 
As previously discussed, Turkey's invasion of Cyprus infringed 
on the United Nations Charter (article l, paragraph 1; article 2, 
paragraphs 3 and 4; and the preamble). As a result, Turkey also vio-
lated article 1 and the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Turkey contravened the fundamental policies against aggression 
and in support of "democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" 
set forth in the preamble and underlying the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Turkey breached both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty. 
Although some argue that the North Atlantic Treaty applies to ag-
gression against a member country only and not to aggression by a 
NATO member against a third party non-member, this interpretation 
is inconsistent with the plain meaning and purpose of the North At-
lantic Treaty. Article 1 prohibits the use of force in "any interna-
tional dispute." 
At a minimum, NATO should have suspended Turkey until its 
aggression in Cyprus had been "purged." 119 Instead, NA TO assisted 
in supplying arms to Turkey after the Congress enacted an embargo 
in 1974.12° Furthermore, NATO's Secretary General Joseph Luns 
joined the Administration's lobbying effort to persuade the Congress 
to lift the embargo against Turkey.121 
Although Turkey continues to violate the North Atlantic Treaty 
by its presence in Cyprus, NATO has ignored the transgression. Tur-
key's invasion of Cyprus is a stain on NATO's history and will remain 
until Turkey ends its illegal occupation of Cyprus. 
119. "Purge" is the word used by Ball and Vance in their testimony in Congress on July 
10, 1975. See Suspension of Prohibitions, supra note 81, at 46. 
120. NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns met with Turkish officials to discuss their 
defense requirements following the United States arms embargo. Luns said that West German 
arms had begun to compensate for the cutoff in American supplies. F.B.l.S., Apr. 29, 1975, at 
Zl. Luns stated: "I assure you and your government that an important number of NATO 
countries have undertaken to meet the arms shortage which was the result of Congress' deci-
sion." F.B.I.S., Apr. 29, 1975, at Z2. 
121. In Washington, D.C., Luns "expressed his concern about Turkey's disaffection with 
the U.S. as the result of the arms cutoff, but said he doubted that Turkey intended to develop 
nuclear weapons." N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1975, at A3, col. 6. Luns was in Washington, D.C. 
and met with President Ford when Congress was considering the repeal of the embargo. N.Y. 
Times, June 20, 1975, at A2, col. 4. 
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E. Human Rights Laws and Conventions 122 
1. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
Human rights considerations have become an integral part of 
United States foreign policy and are clearly set forth in our military 
assistance and military sales statutes. Section 116 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 has been in effect since 1975.123 Section 116 
states that no assistance may be provided: 
to the government of any country which engages in a consistent pat-
tern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, 
including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the disappear-
ance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those 
persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the 
security of persons, unless such assistance will directly benefit the 
needy people in such country.124 
Even tougher parallel provisions relate to military assistance. 
Section 502B(a)(l) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 makes 
human rights an integral part of all United States foreign policy. It 
provides: 
122. This article deals only with human rights issues pertaining to Cyprus. It does not 
deal with the question of human rights violations by the Turkish Government against Turkish 
citizens in Turkey, including the Kurds, of which there have been a number of reports. For 
more on this subject, see the following Amnesty International Reports: Continuing Violations 
of Human Rights in Turkey (1986) (AI Index No. EUR 44/33/87); Turkey: Brutal and 
Systematic Abuse of Human Rights (1989); Turkey: Human Rights Denied (Nov. 1988) (AI 
Index No. EUR 44/65/88); Saeedpour, The Kurdish Way of Life in Turkey: A Tapestry of 
Tribulations, Kurdish Times, Spring 1986, at 7; Speech, Killing Them Softly - The Iraqi 
Kurdish Refugees in Turkey, by Dr. Vera Saeedpour at a conference entitled "Turkey's 
Violations of Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy" held by the American 
Hellenic Institute, Washington, D.C. (May 6, 1989). See also Report of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York on Torture in Turkey: The Legal Systems Response, 45 RECORD 
6-131 and its Selected Bibliography, app. 3, at 124-31 (1990). 
123. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961), as amended by 
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-161, § 310, 89 
Stat. 860 (1975) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1988)) [hereinafter Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961]. While this provision, and § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 
amended, were not in force at the time of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974, their terms 
apply to the continuing occupation of Cyprus, the continuing detention of persons, the contin-
uing taking and use of Greek Cypriot homes and property, the continuing prevention by armed 
force of the return of people to their homes and property, the deprivation of freedom of move-
ment and other violations. See id.; see also infra notes 125, 126 and 127 and accompanying 
text. 
124. Id. The same content can also be found in § 112(a) of the Agricultural Trade Devel-
opment and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, Pub. L. 95-88, § 203,91 stat. 545 (1977)(cur-
rent version at 7 U.S.C. § 1712 (1988)), which likewise prohibits food aid to states that grossly 
violate human rights unless it can be shown that it would directly benefit the needy. 
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(1) The United States shall, in accordance with its international obli-
gations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in keep-
ing with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United 
States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms throughout the world without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion. Accordingly, a principal goal of 
the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the in-
creased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all 
countries. 12s 
(2) Except under circumstances specified in this Section, no security 
assistance may be provided to any country the government of which 
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights .... 126 
In concrete terms, the President: 
is directed to formulate and conduct military assistance programs ... 
in a manner which will promote and advance human rights. These 
programs are also designed to avoid identification of the United 
States with governments which deny to their people internationally 
recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, in violation of 
international law or in contravention of the policy of the United 
States as expressed in section 502B(a)(l) or otherwise.127 
63 
The law prohibits security assistance to a country and to the "po-
lice, domestic intelligence, or similar law enforcement forces of a 
country," as well as the export of crime control and detection instru-
ments and equipment to a country, "the government of which engages 
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights," unless the President certifies that "extraordinary cir-
cumstances" warrant otherwise. 128 
By its actions in Cyprus, Turkey is in clear and incontrovertible 
violation of section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Tur-
key has engaged and continues to engage "in a consistent pattern of 
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights." Simi-
larly, Turkey's actions in Cyprus make her ineligible under section 
502B(a)(l) of the Act which provides that "no security assistance may 
be provided to any country the government of which engages in a 
125. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1795 (1974) as 
amended by the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. 
L. No. 94-329, § 301(a), 90 Stat. 748 (1976) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (a)(2) (1988)) 
[hereinafter Foreign Assistance Act of 1974]. 
126. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, supra note 123, at§ 502(B)(a)(2) (current ver-
sion at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1988)). 
127. Id. at § 502(B)(a)(3) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(3) (1988)). 
128. Id. at § 502(B)(a)(2) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1988)). 
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consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized 
human rights." A list of Turkey's human rights violations include: 
1. the abduction and prolonged clandestine detention without 
charges of five American citizens (the period of detention is 
now over seventeen years);129 
2. the abduction and prolonged and clandestine detention 
without charges of 1614 Greek Cypriots (the period of de-
tention is now over seventeen years); 
3. the taking by force of over 35,000 thousand Greek Cypriot 
homes and property in the occupied north of Cyprus (most 
of these homes have been taken for a period of over seven-
teen years); 
4. the prevention by armed force of the return of the Greek 
Cypriots to their homes and lands in safety in the occupied 
north; 
5. the giving or selling of these Greek Cypriot homes and lands 
to the illegal Turkish settlers and occupation forces in the 
occupied north of Cyprus; 130 
6. the illegal use on a continuing basis by the illegal Turkish 
occupation forces and colonists of Greek Cypriot homes and 
property in the occupied north of Cyprus; and, 
7. the illegal taking of property owned by United States citi-
zens and the illegal use of such property by the Turkish oc-
cupation forces and the illegal Turkish colonists. 
The Executive Branch has a duty to enforce the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961 and immediately halt all military and economic aid 
to Turkey because of Turkey's human rights violations in Cyprus. If 
the purported goal of United States foreign policy is to promote 
human rights, then Turkey's offenses against Greek Cypriots and con-
tinued occupation of Cyprus should not be ignored. 
2. European Convention on Human Rights 
On the transnational level, the regional European Convention 
For The Protection Of Human Rights And Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights) is, by the terms of its pre-
amble, an extension of the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 1948.131 The government of Cyprus filed three 
129. 127 CONG. REC., 9,887 (1981); Det. Free Press, Feb. 15, 1981, at 3A, col. 1. 
130. The Geneva Cortvention of 1949, §III, art. 49, 6 USTIA 3517, 3548 (1955) [herein-
after Geneva Convention]. The Geneva Convention prohibits colonization by the occupying 
power. Id. 
131. The United Nations Charter stipulates legal obligations on the part of its members 
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applications to the European Commission on Human Rights.132 The 
Commission issued its report on the charges made in the first two 
applications on July 10, 1976.133 In it, the Commission found Turkey 
guilty of violating the following articles of the European Convention 
on Human Rights: 
(1) Article 2 - by the killing of innocent civilians committed on 
a substantial scale; 134 
(2) Article 3 - by the rape of women of all ages from 12 to 71; 13s 
(3) Article 3 - by inhuman treatment of prisoners and persons 
detained; 136 
(4) Article 5 - by deprivation of liberty with regard to detainees 
and missing persons - a continuing violation; 137 
(5) Article 8 - by displacement of persons creating more than 
170,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, and by refusing to allow the 
refugees to return to their homes - a continuing violation;138 
to "promote . .. universal respect for and observance of human rights .. .. " U.N. CHARTER, 
art. 1, para. 55(c), 56. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 
defines the term "human rights and fundamental freedoms." G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR 
(183rd plenary mtg.), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Its 
provisions have been duplicated or amplified in subsequent international instruments, includ-
ing the European Convention on Human Rights, which explicitly acknowledges the Universal 
Declaration as the matrix of principles of human rights. Consequently, when Turkey violates 
provisions of the European Convention, Turkey also violates comparable provisions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations mandate on human rights. 
132. The first application to the European Commission on Human Rights, No. 6780/74, 
was filed on September 17, 1974; the second application, No. 6950175, was filed on March 21, 
1975; and the third in October 1978. 
133. The report was not officially published until January 20, 1979, after it had been 
considered by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. 
134. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. 
Article 2(1) states: "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be de-
prived of his life intentionally .. . . " Id.; see also Universal Declaration, art. 3, supra note 131, 
which states: "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." 
135. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 3. Article 3 
states, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." This is the counterpart to article 5 of the Universal Declaration, supra note 131. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at art. 5(1). Article 5(1) states, "[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security 
of person." See also Universal Declaration, supra note 131, at art. 3. Moreover, article 9 of 
the Universal Declaration reads: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile." See Universal Declaration, supra note 131. 
138. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 8(1). Article 
8(1) states that, "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence." Id. Universal Declaration, supra note 131, at art. 12, reads: "No 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspon-
dence . ... " See also Universal Declaration, supra note 131, at art. 17(2) ("No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his property"). Id. at art. 13(1) ("Everyone has the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of each State.") 
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(6) Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention - by depri-
vation of possessions, looting and robbery on an extensive 
scale. 139 
On January 23, 1977, the London Sunday Times published ex-
cerpts of the report and stated: "It amounts to a massive indictment 
of the Ankara government for the murder, rape and looting by its 
army in Cyprus during and after the Turkish invasion of summer 
1974."140 
139. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 134, at art. 1 to the First 
Protocol to the Convention. This section states: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to 
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except 
in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law." Id. One newspaper described the looting: "Confidential 
United Nations military documents . .. disclose that looting is being systematically carried out 
on a massive scale by the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot authorities in the north of the island." 
The Sunday Times (London), Dec. 13, 1976, at 1, col. h. The documents: 
state categorically that scores of Greek Cypriots are being forced to leave their houses 
... and that robbery is now wide-spread in parts of Turkish-held Cyprus. . . . [T]he 
documents ... describe in detail how the Turkish authorities in Famagusta have for 
more than a year been organizing daily convoys of lorries to transport property from 
Greek Cypriot homes and shops. . . . The documents, which speak of Greek Cypriots 
being forced to sign applications to leave their homes in Turkish-helcl"districts, also 
refer to attacks on Greek Cypriots. . . . [The documents] take the form of a summary of 
events in the United Nations' six military sectors and each is signed by an officer in the 
United Nations international police force. 
Id. The U.N. confirmed the genuineness of the documents but had no comment on their 
contents. Id. 
On March 4, 1991, the European Human Rights Commission decided to consider Appli-
cation Numbers 15299/89, 15300/89 and 15318/89 from three individual Greek Cypriots 
against Turkey for violations of human rights in the Turkish-occupied areas of Cyprus. Arti-
cle 25 of the Convention authorizes applications from individuals. Turkey ratified the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights on January 28, 1987, with certain territorial restrictions 
aimed at excluding Turkey from cases of alleged violations in the occupied areas of Cyprus. 
The Commission ruled that Turkey's territorial restrictions were invalid and that Turkey was 
subject to the provisions of the Convention for actions occurring after January 28, 1987, the 
date of Turkey's ratification of the Convention. The first and second applicants, two Greek 
priests, complained about their detention on July 19, 1989, and alleged ill-treatment and viola-
tions of articles 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 13 of the Convention. The third applicant, Titina Loizidou, 
alleged violations of articles 3 and 5 regarding her detention during the "Women Walk Home" 
march on March 19, 1989, and continuing violations of article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ("Every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. . . . ") regarding 
Turkey's refusing her access to her property in the occupied district of Kyrenia, Cyprus, after 
January 28, 1987. She is the first Greek Cypriot to sue Turkey over property rights. The 
Commission will now consider the merits of the applications. The government of Cyprus de-
scribed the Commission's decision as "a significant landmark." 
140. The Sunday Times, (London), Jan. 23, 1977, at l, col. 1. 
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3. Geneva Convention of 1949 141 
The Geneva Convention of 1949, section Ill, article 49, prohibits 
colonization by an occupying power. Generally, section III of the 
convention deals with Occupied Territories. Article 49 states in its 
last paragraph: "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer 
parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." To-
day there are reported estimates of 80,000 illegal Turkish colonists in 
Cyprus.142 
III. DID THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION, THROUGH THE 
ACTIONS OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER, VIOLATE 
UNITED STATES LAWS IN CONNECTION WITH 
TURKEY'S INVASION OF CYPRUS? 
A. United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and The Foreign 
Military Sales Act 
As discussed above, Turkey's use of American-supplied arms and 
equipment in its aggression against Cyprus was not in accordance 
with the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Section 502 
of that Act limits the use of assistance to internal security, legitimate 
self-defense and regional and collective defensive arrangements. Fur-
thermore, Turkey did not seek or obtain the requisite formal consent 
from the United States to use our arms for purposes not provided for 
in the Foreign Assistance Act and Foreign Military Sales Act. As a 
result, Turkey was acting in violation of section 505( d) of the Act and 
section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act and became "immedi-
ately ineligible" for further military assistance and sales. 
Kissinger, as Secretary of State, was the primary official responsi-
ble for implementation of section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961 and section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act of the 
United States. 143 Except for the President, Kissinger had final au-
thority regarding these particular laws. 144 
141. Geneva Convention, supra note 130. 
142. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper Y eniduzen reported that of the 160,000 persons 
who live in the occupied area, 80,000 are Turkish Cypriots and 80,000 are settlers from Tur-
key. Yeniduzen, Feb. 14, 1990. The Guardian, in a report on the migration of Turks to the 
occupied part of Cyprus, listed the rate of migration as 1,500 to 2,500 a month and asserted 
that the plan was "to implant as many as 80,000" settlers. Guardian, Oct. 13, 1975, at 1, col. 
5. The government of Cyprus has also estimated the number of colonists at 80,000. 
143. See Exec. Order No. 10973, as amended, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1974), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2381, note (Supp. II 1972); Exec. Order No. 11501, as amended, 3 C.F.R. 267 (1974), re-
printed in 22 U.S.C. § 2751, note (1970 and Supp. II 1972). 
144. Id. 
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Kissinger continued to authorize arms shipments to Turkey fol-
lowing Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. He failed to declare Turkey "im-
mediately ineligible" for further assistance and sales as required under 
the plain language of section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
and section 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act. This was a viola-
tion of section 505(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and sec-
tion 3(c) of the Foreign Military Sales Act This clear and deliberate 
violation of United States laws led Congress to pass the embargo legis-
lation against Turkey. Kissinger also violated his constitutional oath 
of office to faithfully uphold and execute the laws of the United 
States. 145 
Kissinger not only acted illegally, but he also failed to deter the 
Greek junta from its planned coup against President Makarios. Kis-
singer's actions prior to the invasion encouraged Turkey to invade 
Cyprus in July 197 4, and his actions thereafter further encouraged 
Turkey to renew its aggression on August 14, 1974. The Los Angeles 
Times reported that Kissinger knew in advance that the Turks 
planned to invade Cyprus in July 1974.146 Nevertheless, Kissinger 
rejected an appeal from the United States Ambassador to Greece, 
Henry Tasca, to use the United States Sixth Fleet to stop the 
invasion. 147 
In an editorial, the New York Times put the responsibility for the 
tragic events in Cyprus on Kissinger's shoulders. The editorial stated 
in part: 
A Library of Congress analysis of pertinent legislation, inserted 
in the Congressional Record by Representative John Brademas of In-
diana, supports the contention of Mr. Brademas and three colleagues 
in a letter to Mr. Kissinger that the cut off in aid to Turkey "is not 
discretionary as a matter of policy, but is mandatory under the terms 
of the Foreign Assistance Act .... " 
Senator Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri charges that President 
145. In his confirmation hearings in September 1973, Kissinger stated the following in a 
colloquy with Senator Frank Church: 
If what I have said to this Committee is to have any meaning, then it would be totally 
inappropriate for me as Secretary or as an advisor to the President to behave like a 
sharp lawyer and to try to split hairs and find some legal justification for something 
clearly against the intent of the law. So I think the better answer to you, Senator, is to 
say that when the law is clearly understood-and it will be my job to make sure that I 
clearly understand the intent of Congress-we may disagree with it, but once the intent 
is clear we will implement not only the letter but the spirit. 
STERN, supra note 20, at 143. 
146. L.A. Times, Nov. 22, 1974, at 1, col. 1. 
147. Id. 
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Ford is being deliberately kept "uninformed" of the mandatory cutoff 
for Turkey "in order to protect erroneous policy judgments made by 
the foreign affairs bureaucracy." But it has been not so much the 
State Department bureaucracy that has so bungled American policy 
in the Cyprus crisis as Mr. Kissinger himself. 
The stalling on the aid cutoff, in violation of the laws, is of a 
piece with Washington's earlier unwillingness to condemn Greece's 
disintegrating junta for the coup against the legal Government of Cy-
prus-a reluctance that encouraged Turkey to intervene on the island. 
It is also consistent with Washington's refusal to condemn Turkey's 
subsequent massive occupation of a third of Cyprus in flagrant 
breach of solemn cease-fire pledges. 
Senator Eagleton, Representative Brademas and their colleagues 
are to be applauded for persisting in their demand for an end to Mr. 
Kissinger's illegal appeasement of Turkish aggression. 148 
69 
A review of the sequence of events leading up to the crisis is in-
structive. After the foiled assassination attempt against Cypriot Pres-
ident Makarios and the coup against his government, the British flew 
Makarios to London to meet with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. 149 
The Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash, stated that they were 
"following the situation closely with the Turkish authorities," that it 
was a Greek Cypriot affair and that the Turkish Cypriots should "not 
... interfere in any way."150 Meanwhile, Nicos Sampson, an ultra-
rightist and discredited former member of the Greek Cypriot national 
liberation movement EOKA, was installed as President of Cyprus. 
The coup and Sampson's appointment were condemned by Britain 
and other nations throughout the world, except the United States. 
While Britain was meeting with Makarios and condemning 
Sampson and the coup, Kissinger gave Turkey both time and the pur-
ported reason to invade Cyprus. Kissinger did not criticize the coup 
and the assassination attempts against President Makarios. 151 In fact, 
Kissinger sought and obtained a postponement of the United Nations 
Security Council meeting from Monday, July 15, 1974, the day of the 
coup, to Friday, July 19, 1974.152 Kissinger instructed the United 
148. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1974, at A28, col. 1. 
149. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1974, at Al, col. 6. 
150. See F.B.l.S., supra note 9. 
151. See STERN, supra note 20, at 112. In his recent book, former Soviet Foreign Minis-
ter Andrei Gromyko wrote that in May 1974, he asked Kissinger "Does the U.S. government 
support the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, or not?" Gromyko interpreted 
Kissinger's response as being in favor of partition and anti-Makarios. A. GROMYKO, MEMO-
RIES 301-03 (1989). 
152. The Christian Science Monitor, July 19, 1974, at 1, col. 2; see also Cyprus Hearings, 
supra note 59, at 76. 
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States Ambassador in Nicosia to meet with the foreign minister of the 
renegade Sampson government,1 53 and had "high American officials" 
leak to the New York Times that the United States was leaning to-
wards Sampson, although no final decision had been made on which 
Cypriot government to recognize. 154 Subsequently, the United Na-
tions accorded Makarios head of state status when he addressed the 
General Assembly on July 19, 1974, but Kissinger failed to do the 
same when Makarios met with him three days later at the State 
Department. 155 
Kissinger undermined the United Nations-sponsored negotia-
tions and cease-fire by approving a statement issued by State Depart-
ment spokesman Robert Anderson. The statement indicated the 
United States' belief that the Turkish Cypriots needed more security 
even though there was no evidence of any threat to the Turkish Cyp-
riot community. The statement appeared to offer United States' sup-
port of the Turkish proposal for partition and was followed the next 
day, August 14, 1974, by renewed Turkish aggression when Turkish 
forces broke out of the five percent of Cyprus they controlled and 
occupied over thirty-seven percent of Cyprus.1 56 Additionally, Kis-
singer breached the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Foreign 
Military Sales Act and his constitutional oath of office by not stopping 
arms shipments to Turkey after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus with 
United States supplied arms. Kissinger also ignored the United Na-
tions Charter and resolutions on Cyprus. 
If the United States had joined Britain and the other members of 
the Security Council in immediate condemnation of the coup and in 
supporting Makarios as the elected leader of Cyprus, the Sampson 
government probably would have fallen before the end of the week. 
This would have removed any possible excuse for Turkey to invade 
Cyprus. Coincidentally, it would have finished the Greek junta gov-
153. N.Y. Times, July 18, 1974, at Al, col. 8. 
154. Id. 
155. See STERN, supra note 20, at 113. 
156. Id. at 131-33. In an editorial on August 19, 1974, the N.Y. Times wrote: "In the 
first forthright statement to come out of official Washington, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger 
said yesterday that Turkey's advance on Cyprus 'has gone beyond what any of its friends or 
sympathizers is prepared to accept ... the spillover of Turkish forces has gone beyond any-
thing contemplated and has caused great distress.'" Kissinger effectively prevented Schles-
inger's initiative from proceeeding. According to Kenan Evren, former president and head of 
Turkey's military government, Turkish troops seized more territory, including Varosha 
(Famagusta), than they had orders to take. In the Turkish daily newspaper, Milliyet, (Oct. 
1990), which published Evren's memoirs, he stated: "The truth is that the Turkish troops 
occupied more land than they planned to occupy." The then-Turkish Premier Bulent Ecevit 
said: "Let it be in our hands, we will give it back in the talks as a concession." 
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ernment as well. In any event, had the United States actively opposed 
Sampson, Turkey's aggression would have been prevented. 
Kissinger never informed Turkey that the Foreign Assistance 
Act would be invoked and aid to Turkey would cease if Turkey in-
vaded Cyprus. Instead, Kissinger's actions kept the Sampson govern-
ment afloat long enough for Turkey to prepare and invade Cyprus. 
Former Under Secretary of State Ball testified before Congress that 
the United States Government should have publicly denounced the 
Greek junta-initiated coup against Makarios and told Greece: "You 
have got to unscramble this coup and restore constitutional govern-
ment," while at the same time saying to Turkey, "You've got to hold 
off while we work this situation out."1s7 In congressional testimony 
approximately one year later, Mr. Vance stated: 
I would have acted differently than the Government did under these 
circumstances. It seemed to me that once the legitimate constitu-
tional government of Cyprus was overthrown by a coup that the first 
and clear step that the United States should have taken was to de-
nounce that action and to state very clearly that it expected the con-
stitutional government to be restored. This would have been in 
conformity with what Great Britain had publicly stated and with 
what our other NATO allies had said. 1ss 
Kissinger went even further. He did nothing to ensure the suc-
cess of the Geneva negotiations nor did he try to prevent further use 
of force by Turkey; in fact, Kissinger seemed to have encouraged it. 
Because United States arms assistance was continuing and Kissinger 
was telling the world that the position of the Turkish Cypriots needed 
"considerable improvement and protection," the Turkish government 
had no incentive to negotiate a reasonable and fair solution. 
With the Turkish invasion of Cyprus on July 20, 1974, General 
Ioannides' junta government in Greece fell. Former Prime Minster 
Constantine Karamanlis returned from self-imposed exile and was 
sworn in on July 24, 1974 to head a unity government. He was there-
after elected, in November 1974, to head the Greek government. In-
stead of working for a settlement between the restored democratic 
government in Greece under Prime Minister Karamanlis and the 
Turkish military dominated government, 1s9 Kissinger tilted fully to-
157. Cyprus Hearings, supra note 59, at pages 40-41. 
158. Suspension of Prohibitions, supra note 81, at 51. 
159. Turkey's National Security Council made the decisions on national security, defense 
and foreign affairs matters. It was chaired by the military chief of staff and a majority of its 
members were military officers. Hitchens, Uncorking the Genie: The Cyprus Question and Tur-
key's Military Rule, 122 Merip Reports 26 (Mar./ Apr. 1984). 
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wards Turkey. 
Because of Kissinger's refusal to halt arms shipments to Turkey, 
legislation was introduced in the House and Senate in September 
1974, to enforce the law by embargoing arms to Turkey. From Sep-
tember to December, 197 4, there were over a dozen votes in the 
House and Senate on the embargo that culminated in a congressio-
nally enacted embargo in December 1974.160 
Throughout the congressional battle Kissinger fought the em-
bargo legislation, personally lobbying Congressmen and Senators. 161 
After the embargo went into effect, the Administration immediately 
undermined it's force by stating that legislation would be introduced 
to repeal it. 
On February 26, 1975, Kissinger had a bill introduced in Con-
gress which would authorize the President to lift the arms embargo on 
Turkey. 162 The Administration, led by Kissinger, mounted a massive 
drive to overturn the embargo163 and scuttle the mandatory sanction 
for violating the United States' policy against aggression. Kissinger 
succeeded, the embargo was partially lifted on October 2, 1975.164 
By not enforcing the penalty provisions of the Foreign Assistance 
Act and the Foreign Military Sales Act against Turkey, Kissinger vio-
lated laws that go to the very heart of United States foreign policy. 
This policy, that weapons and aid from the United States are not to be 
used for offensive strikes, is fundamental not only to American for-
eign policy, but is also central to the purposes underlying the United 
Nations Charter, namely, that disputes be settled peacefully and not 
by the threat or use of force. 
What can be done when a cabinet officer violates the law? Im-
peachment is possible but not easily available. Media involvement is 
important to highlight issues and seek investigations or the appoint-
ment of a special prosecutor. Congress can hold substantive and over-
sight hearings and call cabinet officers to testify and fully discuss 
alleged improprieties. 165 Congress can also call for a special prosecu-
160. See generally supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
161. STERN, supra note 20, at 142. 
162. N.Y. Times, supra note 78. 
163. STERN, supra note 20, at 154-55. See also STERN, supra note 20, at 147: "Kissinger 
pulled all the stops in his struggle to assert executive supremacy over the foreign policy process 
even though the policies of the executive branch placed it in violation of the law. The similari-
ties with Watergate in the eyes of Eagleton and other opponents of the administration were 
chilling." Kissinger also resorted to ethnic epithets when "[h]e lashed out repeatedly in those 
days at the 'Greek lobby' and the 'Greek congressmen.'" Id. at 141. 
164. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
165. The Iran-Contra hearings focused on the rule of law. A Special Prosecutor was 
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tor. The academic community can participate through testimony, in-
terviews, letters to editors and articles in academic journals. 
Unfortunately, the academic community has been relatively silent 
about the plight of Cyprus over the past seventeen years. 
B. President Bush's Actions Compared to Kissinger's Actions 
In contrast to Kissinger's response to Turkey's invasion and oc-
cupation of Cyprus, President Bush's actions following Iraq's invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait were decisive in support of the United Na-
tions Charter and the rule of law. Some of Kissinger's actions were in 
direct violation of United States laws and most were contrary to the 
policy and spirit of the United States foreign assistance laws, the 
United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. On the other 
hand, President Bush immediately condemned Iraq's invasion as "na-
ked aggression" and a violation of the United Nations Charter and 
international law. The White House issued the following statement 
within hours of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait: 
The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of 
Kuwait and calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
all Iraqi forces. We have conveyed this message to the Iraqi Ambas-
sador in Washington and to the Iraqi Government through our Em-
bassy in Baghdad. We deplore this blatant use of military aggression 
and violation of the U.N. Charter. Together with Kuwait we are 
calling for an emergency session of the U.N. Security Council. 166 
Bush mounted a massive diplomatic effort to obtain multina-
tional support for the rule of law from the world community. Bush 
worked through the United Nations and with the Kuwait government 
officials who had fled to Saudi Arabia. As a result of his efforts, the 
United Nations Security Council met in emergency session on the 
morning of August 2, 1990. The Security Council unanimously 
passed, by a vote of fourteen to zero with Yemen not participating, 
Security Council Resolution 660167 condemning Iraq's invasion and 
demanding Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from 
Kuwait. 
The same day, Bush froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets under United 
named to investigate former National Security Advisor Admiral John Poindexter, National 
Security Council staff aide Colonel Oliver North and others. Poindexter and North were in-
dicted for alleged diversion of funds to the Contras in violation of the Boland Amendment 
restricting aid to the Contras. 
166. See White House Press Release, supra note 1. 
167. See S.C. Res. 660, supra note 2. Yemen's representative explained his abstention by 
stating that he had not received instructions from his government. 
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States jurisdiction and stopped all commercial dealings with Iraq. 168 
Britain, France and Switzerland followed suit. 169 
On August 3, 1990, Secretary of State James A. Baker III and 
Soviet Foreign Minister Edward A. Shevardnadze issued a joint state-
ment in Moscow condemning "the brutal and illegal invasion of Ku-
wait by Iraqi military forces" and urged a worldwide stoppage of 
arms deliveries to Iraq. They stated that "[g]overnments that engage 
in blatant aggression must know that the international community 
cannot and will not acquiesce in nor facilitate aggression.'' The Sovi-
ets stopped arms deliveries to Iraq and joined the call for withdrawal 
of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. 170 
Bush continued his diplomatic efforts through the United Na-
tions and bilaterally. On August 6, 1990, the Security Council voted 
to impose mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq aimed at ending the 
occupation of Kuwait. 171 A sanctions committee was also established. 
On August 7, 1990, Bush obtained a formal request from the Saudi 
Arabian government to send American troops and equipment to 
Saudi Arabia for defensive purposes to prevent and deter any armed 
attack on Saudi Arabia by Iraq. 172 Such a request is in accordance 
with article 51 of the Charter. On August 9, 1990 the Security Coun-
cil unanimously passed Resolution 662 deciding that Iraq's annexa-
tion of Kuwait "has no legal validity, and is considered null and 
void." 173 On August 12, 1990, Bush ordered United States forces to 
halt all shipments of Iraqi oil exports and all imports except some 
food shipments. Bush had received a letter that morning from the 
Emir of Kuwait requesting that the United States, in accordance with 
article 51 of the Charter and the right of individual and collective self-
defense, enforce the United Nations-mandated economic sanctions 
against Iraq and Kuwait. 174 On August 18, 1990, the Security Coun-
cil unanimously passed Resolution 664 demanding that Iraq "permit 
and facilitate the immediate departure from Kuwait and Iraq" of all 
168. Exec. Order Nos. 12722 and 12723, 55 Fed. Reg. 31803, 31805 (1990). Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1951 & Supp. 1990), the 
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1951), and 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1955 & Supp. 
1990). N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1990, at 9, col. 1. 
169. Wash. Post, Aug. 3, 1990, at A25, col. 6. 
170. N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1990, at A6, col. 1. The joint statement is a reflection of United 
States-Soviet post-Cold War comity. The Soviet action was particularly significant since Iraq 
is considered their ally and the Soviet's have been Iraq's primary arms supplier. 
171. See S.C. Res. 661, supra note 3. 
172. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1990, at Al, col. 6. 
173. S.C. Res 662, 45 U.N. SCOR (2934th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21471 (1990). 
174. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at Al, col. 6. 
54
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1991], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol17/iss1/3
1991] Cyprus and the Rule of Law 75 
third country nationals. 175 On August 25, 1990 the Security Council 
passed Resolution 665, by a vote of thirteen to zero, authorizing the 
use of force to carry out the blockade of Iraq. 176 The Security Coun-
cil called for "measures commensurate to specific circumstances" to 
achieve compliance with economic sanctions against Iraq. 
Bush met with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Helsinki 
on September 9, 1990. They issued a joint statement condemning 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and reaffirmed their support for United Na-
tion's Security Council Resolutions and declared "that aggression 
cannot and will not pay." The joint statement read in part: 
We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be 
tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states 
can devour their smaller neighbors. 
* * * * * 
Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions is acceptable. 
* * * * * 
We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanc-
tions mandated by the United Nations, and we pledge to work, indi-
vidually and in concert, to ensure full compliance with the sanctions. 
* * * * • 
[W]e are determined to see this aggression end, and if the cur-
rent steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider additional ones 
consistent with the U.N. Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any 
doubt that aggression cannot and will not pay. 177 
175. S.C. Res 664, 45 U.N. SCOR (2937th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21562 (1990). 
176. See S.C. Res. 665, supra note 4. Cuba and Yemen abstained. 
177. Joint Statement of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, at Helsinki, Finland (Sept. 9, 
1990): 
We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peace-
ful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors. 
We reaffirm the joint statement of our foreign ministers of Aug. 3, 1990, and our 
support for United Nations Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664 and 665. 
Today, we once again call upon the Government of Iraq to withdraw uncondition-
ally from Kuwait, to allow the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and to 
free all hostages now held in Iraq and Kuwait. 
Nothing short of the complete implementation of the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions is acceptable. 
Nothing short of a return to the pre-Aug. 2 status of Kuwait can end Iraq's isola-
tion. 
We call upon the entire world community to adhere to the sanctions mandated by 
the United Nations, and we pledge to work, individually and in concert, to ensure full 
compliance with the sanctions. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet 
Union recognize that U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 permits, in humanitarian 
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On September 13, 1990, the Security Counsel passed Resolution 
666, by a vote of thirteen to zero supporting the humanitarian efforts 
to supply foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait. 178 Three days later, the Se-
curity Council condemned aggressive acts by Iraq against diplomatic 
personnel in Kuwait. 179 Next, the Security Council entrusted its 
Sanctions Committee to examine requests for assistance from coun-
tries with special economic problems and to make recommendations 
to handle such situations. 180 On September 25, 1990, the Security 
Council, with thirteen of its fifteen members represented at the foreign 
minister level, 181 passed Resolution 670 by a vote of fourteen to 
circumstances, the importation into Iraq and Kuwait of food. The Sanctions Commit-
tee will make recommendations to the Security Council on what would constitute hu-
manitarian circumstances. The United States and the Soviet Union further agree that 
any such imports must be strictly monitored by the appropriate international agencies 
to ensure that food reaches only those for whom it is intended, with special priority 
being given to meeting the needs of children. 
Our preference is to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we will be united against 
Iraq's aggression as long as the crisis exists. However, we are determined to see this 
aggression end, and if the current steps fail to end it, we are prepared to consider addi-
tional ones consistent with the U.N. Charter. We must demonstrate beyond any doubt 
that aggression cannot and will not pay. 
As soon as the objectives mandated by the U.N. Security Council resolutions men-
tioned above have been achieved, and we have demonstrated that aggression does not 
pay, the Presidents direct their foreign ministers to work with countries in the region 
and outside it to develop regional security structures and measures to promote peace 
and stability. It is essential to work actively to resolve all remaining conflicts in the 
Middle East and Persian Gulf. Both sides will continue to consult each other and 
initiate measures to pursue these broader objectives at the proper time. 
N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1990, at A7, col. 1. 
178. S.C. Res. 666, 45 U.N. SCOR (2939th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21747 (1990) (Cuba and 
Yemen opposed). 
179. S.C. Res. 667, 45 U.N. SCOR (2940th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21774 (1990). 
180. S.C. Res. 669, 45 U.N. SCOR (2942d mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21811 (1990). 
181. It was only the third time in the 45-year history of the United Nations that such a 
large number of foreign ministers represented the nations that comprise the Security Council. 
Secretary of State James A. Baker III took the seat for the United States. Soviet Foreign 
Minister Edward Shevardnadze presided over the meeting. Wash. Post, Sept. 26, 1990, at Al , 
col. 4. Shevardnadze also addressed the General Assembly and attacked Iraq with the strong-
est language the Soviet Union had used since the crisis began. He stated in part: 
An act of terrorism has been perpetrated against the emerging new world order. 
This is a major affront to mankind. Unless we find a way to respond to it and cope with 
the situation, our civilization will be thrown back by half a century. 
Iraqi actions are having and will have the gravest consequences for the people of 
Iraq and for millions of men, women and children in many countries of the world, for 
their hopes and their future. War may break out in the gulf region any day, any mo-
ment. 
From this rostrum we would like to appeal once again to the leaders of Iraq. We 
are doing it as their old friends and as a country which has found the courage to con-
demn its wrongdoings against certain states in the past. We c~ll upon them to hear 
reason, and to obey the demands of law and also of plain common sense, to take a 
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one.182 Resolution 670 imposed an embargo on air traffic to Iraq and 
Kuwait, tightened the economic blockade against the Iraqi govern-
ment, called for the detention of Iraqi merchant ships, and empha-
sized that measures would be considered against countries evading the 
sanctions. On October 29, 1990, the Security Council set the ground-
work for making Iraq legally liable for human rights violations and 
financial damages caused by the invasion and occupation of Ku-
wait.183 One month later, the Security Council unanimously passed 
Resolution 677 to take steps to safeguard the demographic composi-
tion of Kuwait.184 Finally, on November 29, 1990, following weeks of 
extensive diplomatic activity by the United States, the Security Coun-
cil at the foreign ministers level passed, by a vote of twelve to two 
with one abstention, Resolution 678 authorizing the use of force if 
Iraq did not comply with all Security Council resolutions by January 
15, 1991.185 China did not exercise its veto. 
At each step, President Bush stressed the illegality of Iraq's ac-
tions, the legal basis for United States actions, full support for and 
adherence to the Charter and Resolutions of the United Nations, and 
support for a multinational response to Iraq's aggression. In the span 
of a few months, President Bush, with the key support of Soviet Presi-
dent Mikhail Gorbachev, did more for the stature of the United Na-
tions and the rule of law in international affairs than anyone since 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower condemned and reversed the inva-
sion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel in October of 1956. 
It is worth recalling Eisenhower's words during the 1956 Middle 
East crisis. In his October 31, 1956 television and radio report to the 
nation on the Middle East crisis, Eisenhower said: 
We believe these actions to have been taken in error, for we do 
responsible and humane attitude, above all vis-a-vis the Iraqi people, who surely yearn 
for peace, tranquility and good relations with their neighbors. 
Some may find that Iraq is being judged by a different, higher standard than that 
applied to other countries even in the quite recent past. My answer is this. It is good 
that we have reached this point; it is a good thing that we have adopted a universal 
human yardstick of good and evil; that we are calling aggression by its proper name and 
consider it necessary to condemn and punish its perpetrator and to help the victim of 
injustice. 
N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at A 10, col. 1. 
182. S.C. Res. 670, 45 U.N. SCOR (2943d mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21816 (1990) (Cuba op-
posed); N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1990, at A 1, col. 6. 
183. S.C. Res. 674, 45 U.N. SCOR (2950th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21911 (1990). The vote 
was 13 to 0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1990, at Al , col. 6. 
184. S.C. Res. 677, 45 U.N. SCOR (2962d mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/21966 (1990). 
185. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 5. Cuba and Yemen opposed and China abstained. 
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not accept the use of force as a wise or proper instrument for the 
settlement of international disputes. 
• • • • • 
The present fact nonetheless seems clear. The action taken can 
scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United 
Nations to which we have all subscribed. And beyond this we are 
forced to doubt that resort to force and war will for long serve the 
permanent interests of the attacking nations. 
Now we must look to the future. 
• • • • • 
I assure you your Government will remain alert to every possi-
bility of this situation and keep in close contact and coordination 
with the legislative branch of this Government. 
We took our first measures in this action yesterday. We went to 
the United Nations with a request that the forces of Israel return to 
their own line and that hostilities in the area be brought to a close. 
This proposal was not adopted because it was vetoed by Great 
Britain and by France. 
It is our hope and intent that this matter will be brought before 
the United Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto operat-
ing, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear in our quest for a 
just end to this tormenting problem. 
In the past the United Nations has proved to be able to find a 
way to end bloodshed. We believe it can and that it will do so again. 
My fellow citizens, as I review the march of world events in re-
cent years I am ever more deeply convinced that the United Nations 
represents the soundest hope for peace in the world. For this very 
reason I believe that the processes of the United Nations need further 
to be developed and strengthened. 
I speak particularly of increasing its ability to secure justice 
under international law. 
In all the recent troubles in the Middle East there have, indeed, 
been injustices suffered by all nations involved. But I do not believe 
that another instrument of injustice - war - is a remedy for these 
wrongs. 
There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we 
were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose 
us and another for our friends. 
The society of nations has been slow in developing means to ap-
ply this truth. But the passionate longing for peace on the part of all 
peoples of the earth compels us to speed our search for new and more 
effective instruments of justice. 
The peace we seek and need means much more than mere ab-
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sence of war. It means the acceptance of law and the fostering of 
justice in all the world. 
To our principles guiding us in this quest we must stand fast. In 
so doing we can honor the hopes of all men for a world in which 
peace will truly and justly reign. 186 
79 
The United States should follow the policy established by Presi-
dent Eisenhower; laws must be applied to friend and foe alike. If, in 
1974, the United States had joined with the world community in con-
demning and trying to reverse Turkey's aggression in Cyprus, would 
Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, have invaded Kuwait in 1990? The 
force of precedent should not be underestimated. 
C. Double Standard 
In the case of Cyprus, a double standard has been applied in Tur-
key's favor in the name of alleged strategic value. 187 American Presi-
186. N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1956, at Al4, col. 5 (emphasis added). 
187. As discussed, the Administration and Kissinger used the national security argu-
ment, centering it on Turkey's alleged strategic importance to the defense of the West and the 
United States in the Cold War era, to excuse their failure to obey the law. The additional 
tragedy of Cyprus is that the alleged strategic importance of Turkey is highly questionable. 
See D. Bolles, Turkey as an Ally-Myth and Reality, in THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 45, at 
56. In the past, proponents of the security argument had stressed the importance of United 
States listening posts in Turkey for verification of any potential treaty. The facts are otherwise. 
As then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird said: "We don't need Turkey to verify a SALT 
agreement. U.S. interests are not protected if we have to depend on a third country." Balti-
more Sun, Aug. 20, 1975, at A4, col. 1. Dr. Herbert P. Scoville, former Director of Research 
for the CIA, stated in a letter to Congressman John F. Seiberling (D-OH) (121 CONG. REC. 
24019-20 (1975)) that: "In sum, the Turkish bases have only marginal utility in verifying past 
or possible future SALT agreements. Other observation sites and satellites would appear 
much more useful. SALT cannot be reasonably used as a justification for making a decision on 
our Turkish aid program." Letter from Dr. Herbert Scoville to Rep. John Seiberling (July 20, 
1975). Regarding United States listening posts in Turkey, Dr. Scoville also stated that: "[T]o 
say that they are essential for verifying past or future SALT agreements would appear to be 
such an exaggeration as to raise questions as to the sincerity of those making the statements." 
Id. Moreover, Turkey's actions these past decades demonstrate that she is an unreliable ally 
who has collaborated with the Soviet Union militarily. Turkey's relationships with the Soviet 
Union raise serious questions as to whether Turkey would have assisted the United States or 
NATO in a conflict with the Soviet Union. As long ago as 1974, strategic analyst Edward 
Luttwak wrote: 
No longer presenting a direct threat to the integrity of Turkish national territory, and 
no longer demanding formal revision of the Straits navigation regime, the Soviet Union 
has nevertheless successfully exercised armed suasion over Turkey, even while main-
taining a fairly benevolent stance, which includes significant aid flows. Faced with a 
sharp relative increase in Russian strategic and naval power, and eager to normalize 
relations with their formidable neighbor, the Turks have chosen to conciliate the Rus-
sians, and have been able to do so at little or no direct cost to themselves. It is only in 
respect to strategic transit that Turkey is of primary importance to the Soviet Union, 
and this is the area where the concessions have been made. Examples of such deflec-
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dents, for example, pressed for the removal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, Cuban troops from Angola and Vietnamese troops from 
Cambodia, while supporting Turkish occupation troops and colonists 
in Cyprus. The United States government calls for the rule of law, 
free elections, majority rule, and protection of minority rights in the 
tion, where the Russians are conciliated at the expense of western rather than specifi-
cally Turkish interests, include the overland traffic agreement (unimpeded Russian 
transit to Iraq and Syria by road), the generous Turkish interpretation of the Montreux 
Convention, which regulates ship movements in the Straits, and above all, the overflight 
permissions accorded to Russian civilian and military aircraft across Turkish air space. 
The alliance relationship in NATO and with the United States no doubt retains a mea-
sure of validity in Turkish eyes, but it is apparent that its supportive effect is not enough 
to counteract Russian suasion, especially since the coercion is latent and packaged in a 
benevolent, diplomatic stance. 
E. LUTTWAK, THE POLITICAL USES OF SEA POWER 60-61 (1974). 
Examples of Turkey's unreliability for United States strategic purposes include: 
(1) During the 1973 Mid-East War, predating the Turkish invasion of Cyprus by one year, 
Turkey refused the United States military overflight rights to resupply Israel and granted the 
USSR overland military convoy rights to resupply Syria and Iraq, and military overflight per-
mission to resupply Egypt. See id. A member of the Turkish Foreign Policy Institute in An-
kara wrote: "During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Moscow's overflights of Turkish airspace 
were tolerated. On the other hand, during the same Middle East conflict, Turkey refused to 
allow the United States refueling and reconnaissance facilities during the American airlift to 
Israel." Karaosmanoglu, Turkey's Security and the Middle East, 52 FOREIGN AFF. 157, 163 
(Fall 1983). 
(2) In the 1977-1978 conflict in Ethiopia, Turkey granted the Soviets military overflight rights 
to supply the pro-Soviet Ethiopian communists under Col. Mengistu, who eventually pre-
vailed. C. MEYER, FACING REALITY-FROM WORLD FEDERALISM TO THE CIA 276-80 (1980). 
(3) Over NA TO objections, Turkey has allowed to date three Soviet aircraft carriers, the Kiev 
on July 18, 1976, the Minsk on Feb. 25, 1979 and the Novorosiisk on May 16, 1983, passage 
rights through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits into the Mediterranean in violation of 
the Montreux Convention of 1936. See generally Wash. Post, July 19, 1976, at Al6, col.l; 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1979, at Al3, col. 1. The Soviet ships posed a formidable threat to the 
United States Sixth Fleet. 
(4) In 1979 Turkey refused to allow the United States to send 69 marines and six helicopters 
to American military facilities at Incirlik in Turkey for possible use in evacuating Americans 
from Iran. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1979, at AS, col. 3. 
(5) Again, in 1979 Turkey refused the United States request to allow U-2 intelligence flights 
(for Salt II verification) over Turkish airspace "unless Moscow agreed." N.Y. Times, May 15, 
1979, at Al, col. 3. This position was voiced over a period of months by Turkish officials, the 
opposition party and the military Chief of Staff, Gen. Kenan Evren. See id. 
(6) In May, 1989, Turkey rejected an American request to inspect an advanced MIG-29 So-
viet fighter plane, flown by a Soviet defector to Turkey. N.Y. Times, May 28, 1989, at Al2, 
col. 1. 
(7) The Turkish government refused repeated American requests for the installation of anten-
nas in Turkey concerning 11 transmitters whose broadcasts would have been directed primar-
ily to the Soviet Union and its eastern European satellites. The initiative by the United States 
Department of State sought to improve reception of programs broadcast by Radio Free Eu-
rope, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of Amenca. 
(8) Turkey further damaged NATO by vetoing NATO's effort to put military bases on various 
Greek islands in the Aegean for defensive purposes against the Soviet navy. 
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Philippines, Nicaragua, Panama, the Eastern European nations and 
elsewhere, but accepts an eighteen percent Turkish minority in Cy-
prus with veto power over most major government decisions. The 
United States makes intense efforts to get our hostages in Lebanon 
released, but remains silent regarding five Americans kidnapped in 
Cyprus in 1974 by Turkey, our NATO ally. 
While Kissinger bears the major responsibility for the tragic 
events of 1974, a number of career foreign service officers and defense 
department officials share the responsibility for the tragedy of Cyprus. 
Ultimately, their failure to support the rule of law and the United 
Nations Charter against Turkey's aggression has damaged American 
interests. 
The Executive Branch of our government tries to create the per-
ception of being a disinterested broker/mediator between Greece and 
Turkey. The reality is otherwise. 188 The American role as Turkey's 
ally is apparent since our aid subsidizes the costs of Turkey's illegal 
occupation and underwrites Turkish subsidies to the illegal Turkish 
Cypriot administration. 189 The United States bears a responsibility to 
redress the situation in Cyprus. It is in the interests of the United 
States in support of the rule of law to do so. 
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The reaction of the world community to Iraq's aggression against 
Kuwait gives hope that Turkey's occupation of Cypriot territory will 
be ended through a peaceful and democratic solution in accordance 
with the United Nations Charter and resolutions on Cyprus. The 
188. See STERN, supra, note 20, at 7. "One of the most important keys to an understand-
ing of the Cyprus muddle is the realization that the United States, far from being a disinter-
ested broker to the disputes of the past, was a deeply involved participant." Id. 
189. Turkey has about 35,000 troops and 80,000 colonists in Cyprus. Former Under 
Secretary of State William Schneider, Jr., stated in testimony on February 21 , 1984, before the 
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, that it 
costs Turkey $9,000 annually to maintain and equip one Turkish soldier. Thus, the cost to 
Turkey in 1984 to maintain its illegal occupation troops in Cyprus was $315,000,000. Figuring 
the costs in 1990 per soldier at $12,000, the cost to Turkey in 1990 will be $420,000,000 for its 
35,000 troops. 
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), the Turkish Cyp-
riot administration's total budget for 1988 was $138,000,000, of which Turkey provided 
$75,900,000. This consisted of $46,000,000 of direct aid and $29,900,000 in credits. United 
States military and economic aid to Turkey in 1989 amounted to $563,000,000. Since money is 
fungible, the United States, in effect, paid for the entire cost of Turkey's maintaining 35,000 
illegal occupation troops in Cyprus and for the subsidy Turkey pays to the illegal Turkish 
Cypriot administration. Specific figures are not available as to any annual payments to the 
illegal 80,000 Turkish colonists/settlers. 
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United States, with the full support of the Soviet Union, was able to 
mobilize the world community through the United Nations against 
Iraqi aggression and for the rule of law. 
There is no fundamental legal difference between Iraq's aggres-
sion against Kuwait and Turkey's aggression against Cyprus that 
would militate against a comparable response against Turkey by the 
world community. To the contrary, Turkey's aggression has been 
compounded over a seventeen-year period, a fact which should weigh 
heavily against Turkey. Turkey's continuing occupation of over 
thirty-seven percent of Cyprus weakens the legal, moral, political and 
diplomatic positions of the United States in the Persian Gulf. The 
United States must insist that Turkey, our friend and ally, "purge" 
itself of its aggression by removing its troops and colonists from Cy-
prus at once without conditions. The withdrawal would be in accord-
ance with the mandate of the United Nations Charter, numerous 
Security Council Resolutions, and the unanimous General Assembly 
Resolution 3212 endorsed by the Security Council. 
The United States, the other four permanent members of the Se-
curity Council - the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China, and the 
world community should follow the Kuwaiti precedent by applying 
international legal norms to Turkey and condemn that nation for its 
"naked aggression" against Cyprus. 
The invasion of Cyprus was in violation of a sovereign nation's 
territorial integrity. The long-standing illegal occupation by Turkish 
forces and continuing colonization by the aggressor country has exac-
erbated the problem. A solution is not difficult if the will to act is 
strong. It is legally and politically untenable to view the situation as a 
question of equal rights between the eighteen percent Turkish minor-
ity and the eighty percent Greek majority. Viable government is not 
possible if, as the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot re-
gime have advocated, the Turkish Cypriot minority has veto power 
over most major government decisions, including taxation. It is also 
not a question of minority rights. Turkish Cypriots continue to enjoy 
minority rights and the Greek Cypriots have offered to have those 
rights guaranteed. The problem is simply one of territorial aggran-
dizement, a Turkish land grab through brute force. 
A policy decision by the Security Council to enforce its resolu-
tions calling for an end to Turkey's illegal occupation and coloniza-
tion of Cyprus is needed. The constitutional issues can then be settled 
in accordance with the rule of law and the universally accepted demo-
cratic principle of majority rule with minority rights fully guaran-
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teed. 190 Once this is done, the road to a peaceful solution is clear. 
The United States should buttress and reinforce its stance against Iraq 
by acting against Turkey in a parallel fashion. 19 1 
If Turkey cooperates, a solution could be reached amicably. If 
not, the diplomatic pressure should increase and be accompanied by 
economic pressure. The European Community has already indicated 
that consideration of Turkey's application for entry into the Commu-
nity is linked to progress on the Cyprus question. The current presi-
dent of the European Community's Council of Ministers, 
Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, recently announced that 
the European Community would soon mount an initiative to promote 
an overall Cyprus settlement within the framework of the United Na-
tions resolutions. The European Parliament unanimously passed a 
resolution endorsing Mr. Poos' statement and calling on the Commu-
nity's Council of Ministers and the foreign affairs ministers meeting in 
the European Political Cooperation group "to intervene actively and 
to take all necessary steps to ensure that the United Nations resolu-
tions on the question of Cyprus are complied with immediately."192 
190. Then Vice President Bush made the following statement on July 7, 1988: "We seek 
for Cyprus a constitutional democracy based on majority rule, the rule of law, and the protec-
tion of minority rights .... I want to see a democratic Cyprus free from the threat of war." 
Speech at the 29th Biennial Clergy-Laity Congress, Greek Orthodox Archdiocese, Boston, 
July 7, 1988. 
President Bush met with the Greek Foreign Minister Antonios Samaras on Jan. 30, 1991. 
A member of the Greek press corps asked Bush: "[D]oes your resolve for implementation of all 
U.N. resolutions include the Cyprus issue as well?" Bush responded: "(W]e've been looking at 
that for a long, long time . ... [T]hat's a problem that I'd love to see solved, in keeping with 
these U.N. resolutions." White House Press Release, Jan. 30, 1991, remarks by the President 
to the Greek press corps. 
191. At a dinner in honor of President George V assiliou at the Kennedy Library on Sep-
tember 21, 1990, Senator Edward M. Kennedy stated: 
We are all familiar with the unconscionable invasion by Turkish troops in 1974 and the 
Turkish occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, which continues to this day. The 
Bush Administration must give higher priority to Cyprus in America's foreign policy. 
Aggression is aggression is aggression. President Bush has made it clear that Iraq's 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait is unacceptable. And it is time he made clear to 
Turkey that their invasion and occupation of Cyprus is just as unacceptable. . . . We 
know the speed with which productive change can come, and we hope that it will come 
to Cyprus soon. In less than two weeks, East will meet West when Germany unites. It 
is also time for North to meet South on Cyprus. The Wall has disappeared in Berlin, 
and the Green Line must disappear in Cyprus. 
Speech given by Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (Sept. 21, 1990). 
192. See Declaration on Cyprus by the European Council at their meeting in Dublin 
(June 27, 1990); announcement at the Council of Ministers meeting, Brussels (Feb. 7, 1991). 
The European Parliament Resolution on Cyprus adopted March 14, 1991 states: 
A. Aware that the international community has taken, as its authority for action in 
the Gulf, the resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations on the invasion 
of Kuwait; 
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United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar addressing 
the Heads of State Meeting of the Conference on Security and Coop-
eration in Europe (CSCE) on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary 
of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975, referred to the Cyprus problem as 
one in which the CSCE had "responsibility ... to render all the neces-
sary support to the efforts for a peaceful and definitive settlement of 
this question now 27 years old." 193 If diplomacy and economic pres-
sure fail then the Kuwaiti precedent should be followed and the Se-
curity Council should apply full economic sanctions against Turkey. 
Ultimately, the two Cypriot communities must decide their rela-
tionships bearing in mind the demographic makeup of the island. 194 
B. Acknowledging the need for the consistent and impartial application of interna-
tional law; 
C. Whereas Turkey has occupied a part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974; 
D. Observing the extent to which the international community has collaborated to 
implement and to apply the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on Kuwait, 
and understanding that equivalent determination should be shown in order to imple-
ment all relevant United Nations resolutions on Cyprus by peaceful means: 
1. Calls on the Council and the Foreign Affairs Ministers meeting in EPC [Euro-
pean Political Cooperation] to intervene actively and to take all necessary steps to 
ensure that the United Nations resolutions on the question of Cyprus are complied 
with immediately; 
2. Endorses the statement made by the President of the Council, Mr. J. Poos, on 7 
February 1991 that the Presidency regards it as part of its duties to resolve any 
crises that affect Community and allied countries, including the Cyprus crisis, and 
that it intends to take an initiative on the basis of the relevant United Nations reso-
lutions under the auspices of Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar; 
3. Calls on the Council and EPC to support the proposals already put forward to 
convene a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), 
on the Helsinki model; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Coun-
cil, EPC, the Governments of Cyprus and Turkey, the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations and all Members of the United Nations Security Council. 
See also Note, Cyprus and the U.N.: A Case for Non-Military Collective Measures, 54 IND. L.J. 
125 (1978-1979). 
193. Speech by Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar (Nov. 19, 1990). "[T]he first 
part of the Helsinki Final Act corresponds to, and is based on, the purposes and principles set 
forth in the Charter of the United Nations and reflects the common will of the States partici-
pating in CSCE to pursue and respect them in everything they do." Id. 
194. The Turkish Cypriots have also been victims of Turkey's actions in Cyprus. Ozker 
Ozgur, leader of the Turkish Cypriot opposition party, in a speech at his party's district con-
gress in Nicosia on April 14, 1989, accused the Denktash regime and the Ozal government in 
Turkey of cooperating in turning the north of Cyprus into a Turkish province. Ozgur stated 
that from 1974 to 1989, 30,000 Turkish Cypriots had emigrated; that if emigration continues 
at the same rate in five or ten years time the Turkish Cypriots would become a minority in the 
north of Cyprus; that an early solution to the intercommunal problem would stop the process. 
He said: 
We are against the use of the workers and peasants from Turkey for the destruction of 
the identity of the Turkish Cypriots and in rendering the Turkish Cypriots ineffective as 
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To be democratic, any future constitution must provide for majority 
rule. President Makarios submitted in the fall of 1963 thirteen pro-
posed amendments to the constitution to correct its undemocratic 
features. 195 
Any settlement must remove minority vetoes of major govern-
ment decisions from the constitution. Additionally, the apartheid 
policy applied by Turkey and the illegal Turkish Cypriot administra-
tion in Cyprus can no longer be tolerated. Denktash has prevented 
contact between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Turkish Cypriots can-
not work in or even visit free Cyprus. Freedom of movement, settle-
ment and property for all lawful Cypriot residents in accordance with 
fundamental human rights is required. 
The comprehensive report of the second United Nations Media-
tor, former president of Ecuador Galo Plaza, contains information 
and proposals which are useful today.196 At the end of his report of 
March 1965, which summarized the background of the situation and 
the positions of the participants, Plaza made some personal observa-
tions for guidance of future discussions. One proposal suggested that 
the Turkish Cypriot community "trade its disproportionate blocking 
power for constitutional and international safeguards of its legitimate 
rights," 197 i.e., that the Turkish Cypriots trade veto provisions over 
major government decisions for ironclad minority rights guaranteed 
by outside institutions, including the United Nations. 
An alleged paramount concern of the Turkish Cypriots is the 
protection of minority rights. 198 The substantive proposals made over 
a communal entity .. . . We must tell the Turkish workers that the Denktash regime 
sees them as cheap labour and vote depots for their own selfish interests. 
Yeniduzen, Apr. 17, 1989. It should be noted that Turkey said it invaded Cyprus to protect 
the security and interests of the Turkish Cypriots. In a united Cyprus the Turkish Cypriots, in 
addition to minority rights (including educational and cultural autonomy), would have an 
improved economic condition which would be enhanced even more if the application of Cy-
prus for entry into the European Community is approved. 
195. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
196. 20 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1965), at 199, U.N. Doc. S/6253 (1965). 
197. Id.; Van Wynen Thomas & Thomas, supra note 103, at 525. 
198. The Turkish Cypriots also say they have a security problem. The Greek Cypriots 
and the Government of Cyprus, however, say they have a security problem stemming from 
Turkey's invasion and the illegal presence in Cyprus of 35,000 Turkish troops and 80,000 
settlers/colonists. The Greek Cypriot proposal of demilitarization of Cyprus, a U.N. interna-
tional force on Cyprus to assist in the maintenance of internal security, and effective interna-
tional guarantees should alleviate the security concerns of both communities. See "Outline 
Proposals for the Establishment of a Federal Republic and for the Solution of the Cyprus 
Problem," Cyprus Bulletin, Feb. 1989, at 3 (spec. ed.). President George Vassiliou and his 
predecessor Spyro Kyprianou have included the demilitarization proposal in their addresses to 
the United Nations General Assembly. Galo Plaza states in his report that Archbishop 
65
Rossides: Cyprus and the Rule of Law
Published by SURFACE, 1991
86 Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com. [Vol. 17:21 
the years by the Greek Cypriots, however, encompass the language of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. Protection of minority rights can be aided 
by allowing for appeal to outside institutions, including the United 
Nations. Up to now, Turkey has used this issue to create an excuse 
for its apartheid and partition policies. Most nations have minorities 
and many have minorities constituting a significant percentage of 
their population. For example, Turkey's Kurdish citizens comprise 
some twenty percent of its population; 199 minorities in the Soviet 
Union comprise a substantial percentage of its population; the United 
States has considerable minorities; and in South Africa the ruling 
white community comprises about twenty percent of the population 
of South Africa. 
The London-Zurich Agreements were imposed on the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots by outside governments and provided for minority 
veto government. Today, there is every reason to believe that the two 
communities, without outside interference, can arrange a workable 
democratic solution "based on majority rule, the rule of law and the 
protection of minority rights. "20° 
President Bush, on the evening of January 16, 1991, the day the 
air war began against Iraqi forces, stated: 
This is an historic moment. We have in this past year made 
great progress in ending the long era of conflict and cold war. We 
Makarios and the other leaders of the Greek Cypriot community "agree that Cyprus . . . 
should be made a demilitarized and non-aligned country." See supra note 196, at paras. 92, 
147 and 148. 
Senator Bob Dole proposed demilitarization of Cyprus during the Senate debate on July 
25, 1978, on the amendment, which passed, to remove the remaining arms embargo on Tur-
key. Dole voted against lifting the embargo and noted that "[n]egotiations between the two 
communities have remained stalemated over the presence of the Turkish occupation force." 
He stated: "The great need for demilitarization of Cyprus, involving withdrawal of both Greek 
and Turkish forces, must be stressed. . . . Once demilitarization of Cyprus is achieved, then 
the intercommunal talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities over the terri-
torial and political settlement will proceed much more smoothly. This must be the goal of all 
parties: to achieve demilitarization of Cyprus as soon as possible. . . . The President should 
also encourage the strengthening of the U.N. security force on the island to assist the demilita-
rization and provide the protection necessary throughout this process. . . . We do not seek to 
dilute the role of the United Nations in bringing peace to Cyprus - we seek to strengthen it. 
That role would be much more difficult ... if we were to resume arms sales and shipments to 
Turkey before her tens of thousands of forces are removed from the island. By upholding the 
rule of law, we encourage its application and effectiveness in the future." 124 CONG. REC. 
22533-5 (1978). 
199. Turkey has not offered its 20% Kurdish minority equal political rights, including 
veto powers, that it claims for the 18% Turkish minority. 
200. See supra, note 190. 
66
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1991], Art. 3
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol17/iss1/3
1991] Cyprus and the Rule of Law 
have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future 
generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the 
law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations. 
When we are successful, and we will be, we have a real chance at 
this new order, an order in which a credible United Nations can use 
its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s 
founders. 201 
87 
President Bush in his State of the Union address to Congress and 
the Nation on January 29, 1991, said: 
I come to this House of the people to speak to you and all Amer-
icans, certain that we stand at a defining hour. 
• • • • • 
For two centuries, we've done the hard work of freedom. And 
tonight, we lead the world in facing down a threat to decency and 
humanity. 
What is at stake is more than one small country, it is a big idea: 
a new world order where diverse nations are drawn ~ogether in com-
mon cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind . . . peace 
and security, freedom and the rule oflaw. Such is a world worthy of 
our struggle and worthy of our children's future. 
The community of nations has resolutely gathered to condemn 
and repel lawless aggression. [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein's 
unprovoked invasion, his ruthless, systematic rape of a peaceful 
neighbor, violated everything the community of nations holds dear. 
The world has said this aggression would not stand, and it will not 
stand. 
Together, we have resisted the trap of appeasement, cynicism 
and isolation that gives temptation to tyrants. The world has an-
swered Saddam's invasion with twelve United Nations resolutions, 
starting with a demand for Iraq's immediate and unconditional with-
drawal and backed up by forces from 28 countries of six continents. 
With few exceptions, the world now stands as one. 
• • • • • 
Most Americans know instinctively why we are in the gulf .... 
They know we must make sure that control of the world's oil re-
sources does not fall into [Hussein's] hands only to finance further 
aggression. They know that we need to build a new, enduring peace 
based not on arms races and confrontation but on shared principles 
and the rule oflaw. 
• • • • • 
201. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at Al4, col. 1. 
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We will succeed in the gulf. And when we do, the world com-
munity will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, 
present or future, who contemplates outlaw aggression. 
The world can therefore seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-
held promise of a new world order where brutality will go unre-
warded and aggression will meet collective resistance. 
* * * * * 
Each of us will measure within ourselves, the value of this great 
struggle. Any cost~any cost-in lives is beyond our power to mea-
sure. But the cost of closing our eyes to aggression is beyond man-
kind's power to imagine. 
This we do know: our cause is just, our cause is moral, our cause 
is right. Let future generations understand the burden and blessings 
of freedom. 
Let them say, we stood where duty required us to stand. Let 
them know that together, we affirmed America, and the world, as a 
community of conscience. 
The winds of change are with us now. The forces of freedom are 
together united. We move toward the next century more confident 
than ever that we have the will at home and abroad to do what must 
be done ... the hard work of freedom. 202 
On February 27, 1991, President Bush announced to the nation 
that "Kuwait is liberated" and declared victory for the allied forces. 
He stated: "This is a victory for the United Nations, for all mankind, 
for the rule of law and for what is right."203 A week later, in his 
address to a joint session of the Congress, Bush said: 
[A]ggression is defeated. The war is over. 
This is a victory for every country in the coalition and for the 
United Nations, a victory for unprecedented international coopera-
202. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1991, at Al2, col. 1. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitch-
ell responded for the Democrats. He said, in part: "Before the war began, we debated openly, 
as democracy demands. We agreed that Iraq's aggression was brutal and illegal and that Iraq 
must leave Kuwait, by force if necessary. The difference was not in the goals but in the means: 
Whether force should be used immediately or only as a last resort if other means failed. No 
one will ever know if that other course would have worked. Now that the war has begun, we'll 
work to see that it's swift and decisive, with the least possible loss of life. . . . Out of the 
tragedy of war, we seek a world where the force of law is more powerful than the force of 
arms. We seek a world where justice and human rights are respected everywhere. Students 
massacred in China, priests murdered in Central America, demonstrators gunned down in 
Lithuania-these acts of violence are as wrong as Iraqi soldiers killing civilians. We cannot 
oppose repression in one place and overlook it in another." Wash. Post, Jan. 30, 1991, at Al5, 
col. 1. 
203. N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al2, col. 1. 
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tion and diplomacy, so well led by our Secretary of State James 
Baker. It is a victory for the rule of law and for what is right. 
• • • • • 
Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided - a 
world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. 
Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in 
which there is the very real prospect of a new world order. In the 
words of Winston Churchill, a "world order" in which "the princi-
ples of justice and fair play . . . protect the weak against the 
strong .... " A world where the United Nations, freed from Cold 
War stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. 
A world in which freedom and respect for human rights finds a home 
among all nations. 
The gulf war put this new world to its first test. And my fellow 
Americans: We passed that test. 
• • • • • 
We went halfway around the world to do what is moral and just 
and right. We fought hard and - with others - we won the war. We 
lifted the yoke of aggression and tyranny from a small country that 
many Americans had never even heard of, and we ask nothing in 
retum.204 
89 
Cyprus is a key test for the new world order. Is the rule of law to 
be applied uniformly, or is there to be a continuation of the double 
standard for Turkey? Enforcing the United Nations resolutions on 
Cyprus against Turkey would demonstrate that the era of a double 
standard on the rule of law and aggression for an ally is over. It 
would add the important ingredient of credibility to our efforts in the 
Persian Gulf for a new world order. To be credible the rule of law 
must be applied to our friends and opponents alike. Enforcing the 
United Nations Charter provisions and resolutions on Cyprus could 
also alleviate tensions between Greece and Turkey and provide the 
basis for cooperation between these two nations to the obvious benefit 
of both their peoples and to the people of Cyprus. 
204. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1991, at A7, col.I. 
The Security Council passed S.C. Res. 686, 46 U.N. SCOR (2978th mtg.) U.N. Doc. SI 
22298 (Mar. 2, 1991), demanding that Iraq implement all 12 previous Security Council resolu-
tions stemming from Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and passed S.C. Res. 687, 46 
U.N. SCOR (298lst mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/22430 (Apr. 3, 1991) setting forth stringent military 
and financial conditions to end the Persian Gulf War, including the removal of Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction and the payment of reparations by Iraq. N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1991, at Al, 
col. 6. Iraq agreed to the conditions in S.C. Res 687 on April 6, 1991. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 
1991, at Al, col. 6. 
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The historic action of the world community against Iraq's inva-
sion and occupation of Kuwait is an extraordinary precedent. 205 The 
potential for using this precedent in Cyprus is great. A unified world 
could force Turkey to relinquish her involvement in Cyprus and let 
the Cypriots come to a solution under their own terms. The prece-
dent value for the rule of law in international affairs, added to the 
Iraq/Kuwait precedent, would be highly significant. 
205. See D. MOYNIHAN, ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1990); Rosenblatt, Book Review, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1990, at l, col. 1; Strasser, Iraq Clash Tests New Alliances-International 
law could emerge victorious, Nat'l L.J ., Sept. 3, 1990, at col. 1; Frank & Patel, UN Police Action 
in Lieu of War: 'The Old Order Changeth', 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); Glennor, The Consti-
tution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Id. at 74; Caron, Iraq and the Force of 
Law: Why Give a Shield of Immunity, Id. at 89; See L. HENKIN, s. HOFFMAN, J. KIRKPAT-
RICK, A. GERSON, W.D. ROGERS & 0. SCHEFFER, RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND THE USE OF FORCE (1989); D'Amato, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. at 201. 
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